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Article 
Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement 
Alan L. Durham† 
In 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari1 and then 
dismissed it as improvidently granted in Laboratory Corp. of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.2 (LabCorp). 
The plaintiff ’s patent claimed a method of diagnosing a vitamin 
deficiency by observing the level of the amino acid homocyste-
ine in a patient’s blood.3 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ste-
vens and Souter, dissented from the dismissal and voiced his 
concern that the patent violated the long-standing rule that 
principles of nature are unpatentable.4 The rule holds that 
scientists who contribute to our understanding of nature, add-
ing to the sum of knowledge but nothing more, cannot secure 
the property rights that convert insight into wealth.5 Patents 
encourage technical achievements through the promise of re-
ward, but natural phenomena and principles of nature per se 
exceed the scope of patentable subject matter.6 Only those who 
apply their understanding in the form of new structures, com-
pounds, or processes may secure a patent,7 and with the patent 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D. 1988, 
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Ran-
dall and the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for their support 
of this research. Thanks also to Creighton Miller and Penny Gibson of the Law 
School Library for their tireless assistance in locating source materials. Copy-
right © 2008 by Alan L. Durham. 
 1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 601, 
601 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari limited to a single question). 
 2. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curium) (mem.). 
 3. Id. at 2921 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 2926–27. 
 5. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948) (“[These discoveries] are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.”). 
 6. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 7. Id. at 187–88; see Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (linking invention to the 
development of an application for “a new and useful end”); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2000) (granting patents to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
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the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the fruits of their disco-
veries.8 In short, where patents are concerned it is better to be 
an Edison than an Einstein.  
Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion, while inconclusive, high-
lights a kind of invention that lies in the netherworld between 
natural principles and the practical application of those prin-
ciples—an invention that relies upon observation, reasoning, 
and a newly discovered natural relationship. The patent did not 
claim the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin defi-
ciencies as such; the patent claimed a method of diagnosis9—a 
method potentially new and useful, and a product of human in-
genuity. Nevertheless, Justice Breyer included the method 
within the traditional prohibition against patenting nature. 
Laws of nature, Justice Breyer reminded, are the “basic tools” 
of research, so fundamental to technological progress that to 
grant exclusive rights to those tools would have the effect of 
stifling, rather than promoting, advancements in the useful 
arts.10 The homocysteine relationship may be one of those “ba-
sic tools,” but the patent claimed only the use of the relation-
ship, as many other patents claim the use of natural phenome-
na for practical ends.11 Is a method of diagnosis really a 
foundation for further research? If so, how can it be distin-
guished from a novel measurement apparatus, where the po-
tential of the invention as a research tool raises no barrier to 
patentability? Something in the traditional dichotomy between 
principle and application breaks down in Justice Breyer’s anal-
ysis.  
What is different and dangerous about the LabCorp patent 
is not its potential for hindering fundamental research but the 
role of knowledge in distinguishing those who infringe. An ig-
norant physician does not observe the forbidden correlation. An 
informed physician, reading a lab report, cannot avoid it. This 
has two consequences. First, it discourages the spread of know-
ledge by penalizing those who receive it. Second, the potentially 
involuntary nature of the infringement threatens to broaden 
the patentee’s market power beyond the intended limits of the 
 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”). 
 8. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement as making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented invention without the patent 
owner’s authority). 
 9. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  
 10. See id. at 2922–23. 
 11. See id. at 2924, 2927. 
 2009] INEVITABLE INFRINGEMENT 935 
 
grant. An unlicensed physician might be forced to abandon legi-
timate activity—like performing blood tests for other purpos-
es—simply to avoid unintended infringement. These are se-
rious concerns and should be the focus of inquiry for patents 
based on observation and analysis. While the traditional rules 
governing the patentability of natural laws and phenomena are 
useful in other contexts, in this instance they fail to separate 
the harmless sheep from the economically menacing wolves. 
Part I of this Article examines the long-standing prohibi-
tion against patenting natural laws and natural phenomena 
per se. Part II discusses the special case of inventions based on 
observation and analysis of natural phenomena and critiques 
Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion. Here, several threads con-
verge, including disputed definitions of “process,”12 the tortuous 
history of the “mental steps” doctrine,13 and conflicting ideas 
about the interaction between patentable subject matter and 
novelty. Part III discusses the economic spill-over effects of pa-
tents based on observing nature and suggests that these ef-
fects, rather than the issues discussed in Parts I and II, are the 
key to identifying the patents that may do serious harm. A pa-
tent that grants market power beyond the inventive contribu-
tion of the patentee imposes unjustified costs.14 It takes from 
the public without corresponding benefit. This, in the end, is a 
more serious concern than whether a patent embraces a law of 
nature or a tool of research. 
I.  NATURAL LAWS AND PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER  
Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress 
the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 
This directive to promote the “useful Arts” is the source of Con-
gress’s authority to issue patents. “Useful arts” is an eigh-
teenth-century term for what today we would call “technolo-
gy.”16 Patents encourage the development of technology by 
 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. See Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU 
L. REV. 1419, 1437–44 (1999); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarifica-
tion of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 
54 (1949) (“The term ‘useful arts’ as used in the Constitution and in the titles 
of the patent statutes is best represented in modern language by the word 
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allowing inventors exclusive rights to their discoveries for a pe-
riod ending twenty years after the filing date of the patent ap-
plication.17 Although the Constitution refers to “science,” histo-
rians conclude that the Framers meant knowledge of all kinds, 
rather than the narrower field to which we apply the term 
“science” today.18 The balanced structure of the clause links 
“science” with “authors” and their “writings”—the province of 
copyright law, not patent law.19 Hence patent law concerns it-
self not with scientific inquiry, as some jurists have mistakenly 
believed,20 but with the useful arts—knowledge, scientific or 
otherwise, applied in practical ways for the benefit of humani-
ty.21 
An invention may be patented only if it is novel and “non-
obvious” in comparison to the “prior art” inventions that pre-
ceded it.22 It must also be useful: it must provide some practical 
benefit, even if it is not superior to existing alternatives.23 An 
inventor must describe the patented invention in a series of 
claims, and those claims must be definite enough to inform oth-
ers skilled in the art of the metes and bounds of the patentee’s 
exclusive rights.24 
Perhaps the most basic requirement of a patentable inven-
tion is that it must fall within the bounds of patentable subject 
matter, defined in § 101 of the Patent Act.25 Section 101 pro-
vides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
 
‘technology.’”). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 18. See Lutz, supra note 16, at 51–55. 
 19. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL 
ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787–1836, at 60–61 
(1998) (citing RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15 
(1925)); Lutz, supra note 16, at 51 (citing DE WOLF, supra). 
 20. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 
U.S. 147, 154–58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 21. See generally WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 19 (“[T]he intellectual 
property clause clearly encompassed two separate powers packaged together; 
one to promote the progress of science . . . through the exclusive grant known 
as a copyright, and the other to promote the useful arts through the exclusive 
grant known as a patent.”). 
 22. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2000 & Supp. 2006); KSR Int’l Co. v. Telef-
lex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965)). 
 23. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental 
Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”26 Patentable subject matter under § 101 may be narrower 
in scope than the Constitution’s general reference to “discove-
ries,” but it is nevertheless exceedingly broad.27 As the Su-
preme Court observed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,28 where it 
found living things created in the laboratory to be within the 
scope of patentable subject matter, “[i]n choosing such expan-
sive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ mod-
ified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contem-
plated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”29 
Indeed, the Committee Reports suggest that the § 101 subject 
matter of patents could “include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”30 
Notwithstanding the general expansiveness of § 101, courts 
have identified certain discoveries that lie beyond its scope, in-
cluding laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.31 These exceptions, rooted in more than 150 years of pa-
tent-law jurisprudence, resist precise definition. The difficulty 
stems from the close relationship between understanding the 
workings of the natural world and applying them in useful 
ways. The scope of a patent should correspond, as nearly as 
possible, to the inventor’s contribution to society.32 Moreover, if 
the goal of the patent system is to enhance public welfare by 
promoting technological advancement,33 the rights conferred 
 
 26. Id. Versions of the Patent Act before 1952 employed similar language, 
but used the term “art” in place of “process.” See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980). The change is not substantive, and “art” maintains a 
presence in the definition of “process” as a “process, art or method.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 100(b) (2000). 
 27. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 
130 (2001). 
 28. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 308. 
 30. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2398–99; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). Senate Report 82-1979 repeats in 
substance House Report 82-1923. 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2394. 
 31. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (listing cases). 
 32. See generally Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005 
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, 6 (“In exchange for the sphere of rights conferred with 
the patent, society requires inventors to reveal their inventions. The disclosure 
requirement is frequently described as the quid pro quo, the inventor’s contri-
bution [to society] in exchange for the powerful patent grant.”). 
 33. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (“The authority of Congress is exer-
cised in the hope that ‘[the] productive effort thereby fostered will have a posi-
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must be broad enough to provide the necessary incentives, but 
not so broad that they deny the public the benefit of new tech-
nologies or discourage further innovation.34 This balancing act 
accounts for many of the problematic distinctions in patent 
law,35 and it sparked debate in some of the earliest cases deal-
ing with the patentability of inventions based on natural prin-
ciples.36 
A. NATURAL LAWS IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF INVENTION 
Modern cases on natural laws and patentable subject mat-
ter still cite a number of nineteenth-century opinions, some in-
volving such illustrious inventors as Samuel Morse and Alex-
ander Graham Bell.37 Few question now, or questioned then, 
the importance of the contributions made by those inventors. 
But patent claims, by their nature, do not confer rights to spe-
cific items (e.g., Morse’s telegraph apparatus in all of its con-
crete detail) but rather to classes of items (e.g., any telegraph 
one might construct, if it includes elements corresponding to 
each element listed in the claim). A claim limited to Morse’s 
own mechanism could have been avoided by minor changes.38 A 
valuable claim, and one corresponding to Morse’s insights, 
must generalize to some extent, including what is new and use-
ful in Morse’s telegraph, but omitting what is nonessential.39 
The questions raised in these early cases concern the extent to 
 
tive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased em-
ployment and better lives for our citizens.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974))). 
 34. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“[A]ll patents are capable of discou-
raging at least some innovation . . . . This discouragement, however, is simply 
part of the cost that the public bears to promote an overall patent system 
whose goal is to motivate more innovation than it deters.”). 
 35. An example of such a problematic distinction is the scope of patent 
claims under the “doctrine of equivalents.” A literal reading of patent claims 
would expose patentees to minor variations that rob them of their monetary 
reward; on the other hand, disregarding claim limitations may stifle innova-
tion through uncertainty. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabu-
shiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33 (2002).  
 36. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 37. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (Samuel Morse); 
The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887) (Alexander Graham Bell). 
 38. See generally Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1854) 
(“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at 
liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions.”). 
 39. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734–44 (discussing the importance of the inven-
tor’s choice to use broad or narrow language in describing the claim). 
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which patent claims can generalize, and whether they can do so 
by reference to the natural law on which the invention relies. 
In 1852 the Supreme Court discussed whether one could 
patent a “principle” in Le Roy v. Tatham.40 The patentee dis-
covered that sections of lead pipe could be securely joined if 
forced together, using conventional machinery, under extreme 
pressure and heat.41 Rather than claiming the novel method as 
such, the patentee claimed the machinery when used in the 
manner described.42 Discovering a new use for an existing ap-
paratus does not permit one to patent the apparatus, so the 
manner in which the patentee characterized the invention 
proved fatal.43 The trial judge had emphasized the new “prin-
ciple” at work, however, and the Court offered some observa-
tions on that point.44 While cautioning that the word “principle” 
had been used by courts and scholars with such imprecision 
that it was likely to mislead,45 the Court explained that prin-
ciples, as such, cannot be patented: 
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; 
a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of 
them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new 
power, should one be discovered in addition to those already known. 
Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to 
have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclu-
sively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of 
electricity, and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to 
all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.46 
Invention lies not in the discovery of natural principles, but 
in devising ways to apply those principles to practical ends.47 
Only the latter are patentable.48 Moreover, an inventor may not 
generalize an invention so far as to claim any means of produc-
ing the desired effect.49 A monopoly of such scope “would dis-
courage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of 
 
 40. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1853). 
 41. See id. at 172. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 176–77. 
 44. Id. at 174–75. 
 45. Id. at 174. 
 46. Id. at 174–75. 
 47. Id. at 175. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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the patent laws.”50 One must leave room for others to devise 
new ways to achieve similar results.51 
One year later, the Supreme Court covered some of the 
same ground in O’Reilly v. Morse.52 The eighth claim of Morse’s 
telegraph patent embraced any use of electromagnetism, then 
known or later developed, for transmitting written characters.53 
The majority rejected Morse’s claim as too broad.54 Anticipating 
further developments in the field of communications, the Court 
observed that “[f]or aught that we now know some future in-
ventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of 
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or gal-
vanic current, without using any part of the process or combi-
nation set forth in the plaintiff ’s specification.”55 The discovery 
of a subsequent inventor might improve on Morse, but if 
Morse’s claim were upheld the inventor of the improvement 
would need Morse’s permission to proceed.56 Like the inventor 
in Le Roy, Morse had to confine himself to the means he had 
devised for harnessing electromagnetism, because policy would 
not tolerate a patent limited only by the effect he had 
achieved.57 
Justice Grier supplied the dissent. “The mere discovery,” 
he wrote, “of a new element, or law, or principle of nature, 
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the sub-
ject of a patent.”58 However, “he who takes this new element or 
power, as yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher, 
and makes it the servant of man; who applies it to the perfect-
ing of a new and useful art . . . is the benefactor to whom the 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 175–76. In dissent, Justice Nelson argued that the patentee had 
discovered a new and valuable “property of lead.” Id. at 178 (Nelson, J., dis-
senting). The patentee did not claim the property as such, but a mode of apply-
ing that property to produce superior manufactures. Id. at 178–79. Under this 
analysis, although a principle could not be patented in the abstract, a practical 
application of a principle could be; unless the patentee had “tied himself down” 
to the particulars of the mode he employed, the patentee should be entitled to 
claim “all modes by which the same result is produced, by an application of the 
same law of nature or property of matter.” Id. at 186. 
 52. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1854). 
 53. Id. at 112. 
 54. Id. at 113. 
 55. Id. The “specification” is the part of a patent including a detailed dis-
closure of the inventor’s preferred embodiments. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PA-
TENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE § 3.3 (2d ed. 2004). 
 56. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113. 
 57. Id. at 119. 
 58. Id. at 132 (Grier, J., dissenting on the question of costs). 
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patent law tenders its protection.”59 One who discovers how a 
law of nature can be put to work is “a discoverer and inventor 
of the highest class,” who may have invested “more labor, ex-
pense, persevering industry, and ingenuity than the inventor of 
any machine.”60 Regarding the application of the claim to im-
provements which might themselves be patentable, Grier did 
not find that this effect had interfered with the development of 
machines and found no reason to fear the effect as applied to 
“arts.”61 
Although the Court rejected patent claims as broad as 
Morse’s claim 8, it did not altogether prohibit inventors from 
generalizing, or seeking to capture what Morse called the “es-
sence” of the invention.62 The Court cited with approval Neilson 
v. Harford,63 an English case concerning an improved furnace.64 
Neilson discovered that a furnace would operate more efficient-
ly if the air used for combustion were preheated.65 In order to 
take advantage of this principle, Neilson invented, and pa-
tented, a “hot-blast” furnace including an air-heating receptacle 
located between the blowing apparatus and the combustion 
chamber.66 The court did not force Neilson to limit his claims to 
a heating receptacle of the same size, shape, or materials as the 
one he had devised; any competent workman could fashion a 
suitable receptacle, and the effect would be similar whatever 
the variations in the apparatus.67 Admitting that the court 
found it difficult to distinguish Neilson’s patent from “a patent 
for a principle,” it concluded that the invention claimed was a 
machine for applying the principle, even if the patent did not 
limit Neilson’s rights to precisely the apparatus he had de-
scribed.68 The United States Supreme Court, recalling the Neil-
son case, observed that the inventor could not have patented 
the discovery that hot air produced superior combustion, be-
cause “the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or 
physical science, is not patentable.”69 But what Neilson had in-
 
 59. Id. at 132–33. 
 60. Id. at 132. 
 61. Id. at 133–34. 
 62. See id. at 114–15 (majority opinion). 
 63. Neilson v. Hartford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1266 (Exch.). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1273. 
 67. Id. at 1273–74. 
 68. Id. at 1273. 
 69. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1854). 
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vented was a mechanism for applying that principle to an im-
proved furnace by interposing a heating receptacle between the 
blower and the combustion chamber.70 Whoever used such a 
vessel used Neilson’s invention and achieved the same results, 
to some extent, regardless of the size or shape of the recep-
tacle.71 In contrast, Morse had not discovered that electromag-
netism would successfully transmit characters at a distance in 
all cases. His patent must be limited to what he had discov-
ered—a particular method of harnessing electromagnetism to 
produce the sought-after result.72 
Both Neilson and Morse are notable for commingling what 
could be considered separate issues: first, whether the patent 
claims eligible subject matter (the application of a natural prin-
ciple rather than the principle in the abstract); and second, 
whether the patent, if enforced, would be unacceptably broad, 
failing to correspond with what the inventor had discovered 
and inhibiting the efforts of subsequent innovators. Although 
there are means today to deal with overbroad claims that do 
not rely on patentable subject matter,73 the early conceptual 
link between breadth and subject matter has never been bro-
ken.74 
B. ENDURING PRINCIPLES 
The early cases laid the foundation for a number of endur-
ing principles concerning the relationship of natural phenome-
na and patentable inventions. These may be summarized as the 
following: (1) natural laws, in the abstract, cannot be pa-
tented;75 (2) natural phenomena, in their natural state, cannot 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 116–17. 
 72. Id. at 117. 
 73. Alternative means include the requirements that the patent specifica-
tion describe the patented invention and enable its practice. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2000); see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he applicant’s specification must enable one of ordi-
nary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.” (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003))); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“[The written description requirement] guards against the inventor’s over-
reaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his fu-
ture claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.” 
(citing Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))).  
 74. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972). 
 75. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
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be patented;76 (3) scientific explanations for phenomena already 
in use cannot be patented;77 and (4) inventions incorporating 
natural principles or phenomena, or based on new understand-
ings of natural law, may be patented.78 
1. Natural Laws in the Abstract 
Computer software—a product of human ingenuity that is 
useful, valuable, but inherently intangible—accounts for many 
of the modern cases dealing with the limits of patentable sub-
ject matter.79 The Supreme Court’s contribution to this evolving 
body of law is largely through the trilogy consisting of Gott-
schalk v. Benson,80 Parker v. Flook,81 and Diamond v. Diehr.82 
Each of these cases supports the venerable rule that natural 
laws cannot be patented in the abstract. 
The patent applicant in Benson devised a series of mathe-
matical steps (an “algorithm”) for converting one form of nu-
merical representation (binary-coded decimal) into another 
form (pure binary).83 Although Benson clearly intended to ap-
ply the mathematics in a programming context,84 the claims 
did not limit him to any specific computer hardware or any par-
ticular use of the technique.85 In a cryptic opinion, the Court re-
jected the claims as unpatentable subject matter.86 Three con-
cerns dominate the Court’s discussion. First, the claims were 
“abstract”87 because they were not tied to any tangible process 
or machinery.88 “[A]bstract intellectual concepts,” the Court 
 
 76. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 77. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 
(1996). 
 78. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 79. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d. 1352, 1356–
58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting attempts by various courts to adapt natural-
phenomena principles to computer technology). 
 80. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 81. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 82. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 83. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64–65. 
 84. See id. at 65 (“The patent sought is on a method of programming a 
general-purpose digital computer . . . .”). 
 85. Id. at 64. 
 86. Id. at 73. 
 87. See id. at 68 (characterizing the applicant’s claims as “abstract and 
sweeping”). 
 88. See id. (noting that the applicant’s process might “be performed 
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any 
apparatus”). The cryptic aspects of the opinion include the nearly contradicto-
ry statements on whether a patentable “process” must involve a physical 
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held, “are not patentable.”89 Second, because the claims were 
abstract, they were also exceedingly broad, covering every use 
of the algorithm that had been or might later be discovered.90 If 
a patent were allowed, it would “wholly pre-empt the mathe-
matical formula.”91 Third, although the Court did not explicitly 
characterize mathematics as a manifestation of nature, the 
Court’s seamless transition from discussing natural phenome-
na to Benson’s algorithm suggests that point of view.92 “Phe-
nomena of nature,” wrote the Court, “though just discovered . . . 
are not patentable . . . .”93 Echoing decisions of the previous 
century,94 Benson concludes with the ambiguous warning that 
“one may not patent an idea.”95  
In Flook, the second case of the trilogy, natural law played 
a more obvious role. The invention concerned the catalytic con-
version of hydrocarbons, a process requiring careful monitoring 
of temperature, pressure, and other conditions.96 Problems 
arise when those conditions exceed certain limits, known as 
“alarm limits.”97 Flook’s idea was to update the alarm limits as 
the reaction took place, to account for the dynamic nature of 
the process.98 His claims described a sequence of taking mea-
surements, calculating new alarm limits using the measured 
values, and updating the alarm limits to reflect the calcula-
 
transformation. Id. at 64, 68. 
 89. Id. at 67. 
 90. Id. at 68 (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to 
cover both known and unknown uses of the [algorithm]. The end use may [ ] 
vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to re-
searching the law books for precedents . . . .”). 
 91. Id. at 72. 
 92. See id. at 67–68 (“He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon 
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. . . . We 
dealt there [Funk Bros.] with a ‘product’ claim, while the present case deals 
with a ‘process’ claim. But we think the same principle applies.” (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Flook, the Court interpreted Ben-
son as treating a mathematical formula or algorithm “like a law of nature.” 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 93. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 94. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 
(1874) (“An idea of itself is not patentable . . . .”). 
 95. 409 U.S. at 71. The warning is ambiguous because every patent claim 
expresses an idea. In Rubber-Tip Pencil, the idea was that one could attach a 
rubber eraser to the end of a pencil. In spite of its practical application, the 
Court reduced the invention to an “idea” about the natural ability of rubber to 
adhere—an idea that was useful but not novel. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507. 
 96. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86. 
 97. Id. at 585. 
 98. See id. 
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tions.99 The only thing that distinguished Flook’s invention 
from the prior art was the computer-implemented mathemati-
cal algorithm used to calculate the new figures.100 Flook’s in-
vention differed from Benson’s in important respects. Flook li-
mited his claims to a particular field of use,101 and his 
invention was not as abstract as Benson’s, linked as it was to a 
physical process. Nevertheless, the Court rejected Flook’s pa-
tent as outside the scope of § 101.102 
Although Flook claimed a “process” in the general sense of 
the term, the Court fell back on the dictate of Le Roy that “[a] 
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth [and] . . . can-
not be patented . . . .”103 While “[t]he line between a patentable 
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear,”104 
Flook’s invention fell on the side of “principle.” The Court 
treated the mathematical formula as though it were already 
known, an approach suggested by Neilson v. Harford105 for ig-
noring the principle itself in order to determine if the applicant 
had invented an application of the principle.106 Because the 
catalytic conversion process was already known, and the Court 
treated the formula as though it too were already known, the 
combination was “comparable to a claim that the formula 2πr 
can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a 
wheel.”107 To the extent that Flook had made a discovery, it 
was not a discovery that the law allowed him to patent.108  
Diehr, the final case of the trilogy, had a different outcome. 
Diehr devised an improved process for molding synthetic rub-
ber.109 In order to determine the optimum time to stop the cur-
ing process, Diehr continuously measured temperatures inside 
the mold and used the data in a mathematical algorithm based 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 585–86, 588. 
 101. See id. at 586. 
 102. See id. at 594–96. 
 103. Id. at 589 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 
(1853)). 
 104. Id. at 589. 
 105. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1272 (Exch.). 
 106. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 592. 
 107. Id. at 595. 
 108. See id. at 593 (“The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot 
be patented rests . . . on the more fundamental understanding that they [natu-
ral phenomena] are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted 
to protect.”). 
 109. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
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on the well-known Arrhenius equation.110 When the calculated 
ideal matched the cure time that had elapsed, a signal from the 
computer directed the opening of the mold.111 The Court held 
Diehr’s claims to be patentable subject matter.112 It distin-
guished Flook on the narrow ground that Flook’s claims, like 
Benson’s, ended with the calculation of a number (Flook’s 
alarm limit).113 In contrast, Diehr claimed an industrial process 
of curing rubber, one part of which happened to employ ma-
thematics.114 A process of curing rubber is, unquestionably, pa-
tentable subject matter.115 
Diehr differs substantially from Flook in its approach to 
the interaction between the patentable-subject-matter re-
quirement of § 101 and the novelty requirement of § 102.116 
However, Diehr reaffirmed the essential rules laid out in the 
previous century, even if it applied them differently than the 
Court had in Flook.117 Section 101, broad as it is, excludes 
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”118 A 
principle in the abstract is a “fundamental truth” to which no 
one can claim exclusive rights.119 If there is a patentable inven-
tion to be derived from the discovery of a principle, “it must 
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and 
useful end.”120 In subsequent cases, the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which usually takes a broad view of patentable sub-
ject matter,121 has also acknowledged the unpatentability of 
natural laws or principles in the abstract.122 
 
 110. Id. at 178. 
 111. Id. at 179. 
 112. Id. at 191–92. 
 113. Id. at 186–87. 
 114. Id. at 187. 
 115. See id. at 191–92. 
 116. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of § 102. 
 117. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185–87. 
 118. Id. at 185. 
 119. Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1853)). 
 120. Id. at 188 n.11 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 121. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 
F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the traditional business methods 
exception to patentable subject matter). 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 1373 (“The Supreme Court has identified three catego-
ries of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely ‘laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185)). 
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2. Natural Phenomena in Their Natural State 
A different question is whether one can patent concrete 
things discovered in nature—such as naturally occurring sub-
stances, organisms, or occurrences. Ex parte Latimer,123 one of 
the early cases to address the issue, refused a patent on the fi-
bers extracted, essentially unchanged,124 from the needles of 
Pinus australis.125 The Commissioner of Patents compared ex-
tracting the fibers from pine needles to “gather[ing] the pebbles 
along the seashore, where the forces of nature have placed 
them.”126 Even if the applicant were first to appreciate the use-
ful qualities of the needles, this did not entitle him to a patent 
monopoly. Patents that embrace “the trees of the forest and the 
plants of the earth” would be “unreasonable and impossible.”127 
Today, when we are accustomed to patents on plants,128 
bacteria,129 and higher organisms,130 rights to the trees of the 
forest and the plants of the earth do not seem so impossible. 
Yet the principle of Latimer remains sound. It is sustained not 
by the distinction between the living and the inanimate, but by 
the distinction “between products of nature, whether living or 
not, and human-made inventions.”131 Modern science allows re-
searchers to modify nature in subtle ways, but it is only in that 
modified form that the products of nature may be patented. 
Even if it qualifies as a discovery to reveal in nature a sub-
stance, plant, or organism previously unknown, such discove-
ries are not patentable subject matter.132 The applicant 
 
 123. Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123. 
 124. Id. at 125 (“Nature made them so and not the process by which they 
are taken from the leaf or needle.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 126. The discovery of an entirely new species would also fail to 
qualify as a patentable discovery. See id. at 127 (“I am not aware of any in-
stance in which it has been held that a natural product is the subject of a pa-
tent, although it may have existed from creation without being discovered.”). 
 128. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 
127 (2001) (holding that plants are patentable subject matter under § 101). 
 129. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (stating that 
bacteria qualify as “manufacture[s]” and “composition[s] of matter” under 
§ 101). 
 130. In 1988, the Patent Office allowed Harvard University researchers to 
patent a mouse genetically engineered to be susceptible to cancer. See U.S. Pa-
tent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984). 
 131. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 130 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313). 
 132. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“[A] new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”). 
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit may hold a contrary view. See Schering 
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in Diamond v. Chakrabarty prevailed because his hydrocarbon-
metabolizing bacteria had been engineered in the laboratory.133 
In contrast, the applicant in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo In-
oculant Co.134 failed because he had only combined species of 
bacteria that already existed in nature.135 This combination fell 
short of invention because it was “no more than the discovery of 
some of the handiwork of nature . . . .”:136  
The combination of species produces no new bacteria . . . and no en-
largement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same ef-
fect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their 
use in combination does not improve in any way their natural func-
tioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee.137 
A researcher who discovered a new use for a naturally oc-
curring bacteria might obtain a patent; a new use is the handi-
work of the inventor.138 But the patent would cover only the 
method of use, not the bacteria itself.139 
3. Explanations of Natural Phenomena 
No one who discovers a scientific explanation for an exist-
ing phenomenon is entitled to exclusive rights.140 In Flook, the 
Court noted that Newton’s expression of gravitational force as a 
relationship between the masses of two bodies and the square 
of the distance between them “always existed—even before 
 
Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“It was and is well understood that an inventor may discover 
something that already existed. . . . [A] previously unknown product does not 
become unpatentable simply because it existed before it was discovered.”). 
 133. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10 (“His claim is not to a hitherto 
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture 
or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive 
name, character [and] use.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 134. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 135. Id. at 131. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 139. See id. (holding that an inventor of a new use for a known compound 
is only entitled to patent the method of use). 
 140. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (“A 
claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition 
of matter, or a design, but never . . . the scientific explanation of their opera-
tion.’” (quoting 6 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON 
PATENTS § 21:17, at 315–16 (3d ed. 1985))); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that applicant is not “entitled to a patent [merely] be-
cause he sets out the scientific formulae [for] explaining what happens”). 
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Newton announced his celebrated law.”141 The discovery of such 
a relationship “carries with it no rights to exclude others from 
its enjoyment.”142 In Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Pam-
lab, L.L.C.,143 the patentee discovered that antioxidants in vi-
tamin supplements destroy vitamin B12 and folate.144 The pa-
tent claimed vitamin supplements omitting destructive 
antioxidants.145 The court noted that B12 and folate composi-
tions free of antioxidants were already known.146 The discovery 
of their advantages could not deny the public the compositions 
it had already used.147 Humanity had enjoyed the benefits of 
fire long before understanding the role of oxygen in combustion; 
the discoverer of oxygen could not have monopolized the use of 
fire.148 Similarly, the patentee’s explanation of why antioxi-
dant-free B12 preparations were more effective than others did 
not entitle him to a patent.149 
4. Inventions Incorporating Natural Phenomena or Based on 
Natural Laws 
Although natural materials or phenomena as such are not 
patentable, one can patent inventions that incorporate them. If 
it were otherwise, one could not patent any process involving 
heat, any apparatus made of metal, or any composition formed 
of atoms.150 Nature always supplies the elements of the pa-
tented invention; it is the use and combination of those ele-
ments that is inventive and patentable.151 For example, even 
 
 141. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (citation omitted). 
 142. Id. As a New York district court expressed it, “the Constitution grants 
monopolies to inventors, not to analysts.” CTS Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp. 
of Am., 469 F. Supp. 801, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 143. 412 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 144. Id. at 1321. 
 145. See id.  
 146. Id. at 1323. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.; see also EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 
268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (origin of the fire/oxygen analogy). 
 149. Upsher-Smith Labs., 412 F.2d at 1323. 
 150. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946). If one 
could not patent a new molecule because “the inevitable result of the action of 
so-called laws of nature which are immutable by man and remain free for the 
use of all,” then no processes or machines could be patented either, because 
forces such as gravity and friction always play a role; “[o]bviously, such an ad-
vanced position cannot be maintained in the face of the patent statute and the 
multitude of authoritative decisions to the contrary.” Id.  
 151. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161–62 
(4th Cir. 1958) (“All of the tangible things with which man deals and for which 
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though Newton could not have patented his law of gravity, an 
inventor could patent a machine that takes advantage of gravi-
ty to achieve a superior result.152 Similarly, inventors can apply 
their understanding of natural laws to create new and patenta-
ble machines, processes, or compositions of matter.153 Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp.154 supplies a popular ex-
ample. The patentee began with a formula expressing the natu-
ral relationship between the length and angle of wires in a ra-
dio transmitting antenna and the radio activity produced.155 
The formula itself would have been unpatentable and, in any 
event, had been discovered by someone else.156 The patentee, 
however, applied the formula to create an antenna with the di-
rectional characteristics he desired.157 The design may or may 
not have been inventive, but it undoubtedly qualified as pa-
tentable subject matter: “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the ma-
thematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel 
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scien-
tific truth may be.”158 The patented antenna was a structure, 
not a formula; it was an application of a natural principle, not 
the principle itself. 
C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DENYING PATENTS ON NATURAL LAWS 
AND NATURAL PHENOMENA 
The rule against patenting nature denies monetary reward 
to some of the greatest discoveries. Einstein,159 Newton,160 Fa-
 
patent protection is granted are products of nature in the sense that nature 
provides the basic source materials. The ‘matter’ of which patentable new and 
useful compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing ele-
ments and materials.”).  
 152. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 992–93 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J., 
concurring) (noting that Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 
261 U.S. 45 (1923), in which the patentee improved a papermaking machine 
by raising one end of the apparatus to improve flow through the force of gravi-
ty, “is often cited approvingly as an example of the proper use of a natural 
phenomenon to produce a new and useful end result”), dismissed as moot sub 
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). 
 153. See Dickey-john Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 
(7th Cir. 1983) (“[A]ll inventions that work can be explained in terms of basic 
truths.”). 
 154. 306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
 155. See id. at 92–93. 
 156. Id. at 93–94. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 94. 
 159. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Einstein 
could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2.”). 
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raday,161 Pythagoras162—even Prometheus163—could expect 
short treatment from the Patent Office, because their “[e]poch-
making ‘discoveries’”164 fell on the wrong side of principle and 
application. If the reason for having patents is to encourage 
discoveries that benefit mankind, why deny patents to those 
who contribute the most to the increase of human knowledge? 
Why single out for reward “those lesser geniuses who put such 
discoveries to practical uses”?165 
The rule can produce results that seem both unfair and at 
odds with the incentives rationale of patent law. In Morton v. 
New York Eye Infirmary,166 the patentee discovered that inha-
lation of sufficient quantities of ether would make patients in-
sensible to pain while undergoing surgery.167 He discovered, in 
other words, the principle of anesthesia. The practical value of 
the discovery can hardly be overstated, as the surgeons who 
testified made plain: “[t]hey agreed in ranking it among the 
great discoveries of modern times; and one of them remarked 
that its value was too great to be estimated in dollars and 
cents . . . . Its discoverer is entitled to be classed among the 
greatest benefactors of mankind.”168 However, the court charac-
terized this “benefactor’s” discovery as one concerning the nat-
ural effects of a known substance on the human body.169 That 
one could operate on a patient rendered insensible by drugs il-
lustrated the utility of the natural effect, but it was no inven-
tion of the patentee.170 He had not devised any new mechanism 
 
 160. See id. (“Newton [could not] have patented the law of gravity.”). 
 161. See Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(“[T]he great discoveries of . . . Faraday could not have been rewarded with 
such a grant of monopoly.”).  
 162. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[T]he Pythagorean 
theorem would not have been patentable . . . .”). 
 163. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 435 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, 
J., dissenting) (“No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent Office.”). 
 164. Katz, 145 F.2d at 961. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865). 
 167. Id. at 882. 
 168. Id. at 883. 
 169. Id. (“At this point the patent breaks down; for the specification 
presents nothing new except the effect produced by well-known agents, admi-
nistered in well-known ways on well-known subjects.”). 
 170. Id. (“The fact that the surgeon can operate upon the body in the condi-
tion to which it is thus reduced forms no part of the invention or discovery. It 
simply furnishes evidence that it can be applied to at least one useful purpose; 
a fact quite independent of the other elements necessary to make a discovery 
patentable.”). 
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with which to apply his discovery,171 so there was nothing he 
could patent.172 A natural principle, such as the intoxicating ef-
fect of ether, could be the “soul” of an invention, but like a “dis-
embodied spirit” it could not be subject to the patentee’s exclu-
sive control until made concrete in a novel and tangible 
means.173 The momentous character of the discovery did not 
change the outcome, nor did it matter “what long, solitary vi-
gils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have been 
wrung from the bosom of Nature.”174 
One would expect an incentives-based system to supply the 
greatest rewards to the greatest discoveries, particularly when 
“solitary vigils” and “importunate efforts” might otherwise go 
uncompensated.175 A system that rewards only the last step in 
practical application directs investments away from the place 
where, in the end, they may show the greatest return.176 The 
Morton opinion supplies few explanations, asserting at one 
point that the unpatentability of such a discovery “needs nei-
ther argument nor authority to prove.”177 
1. Legislative Intent and Constitutional Authority 
One explanation might rest on the limits of congressional 
power or the legislative intentions embodied in § 101 of the Pa-
tent Act. Although the Copyright and Patent Clause of the 
Constitution refers to “[d]iscoveries,”178 they are the discoveries 
of “inventors,”179 which may imply that only a limited class of 
 
 171. Id. (“This new or additional effect is not produced by any new instru-
ment by which the agent is administered, nor by any different application of it 
to the body of the patient. It is simply produced by increasing the quantity of 
the vapor inhaled. And even this quantity is to be regulated by the discretion 
of the operator, and may vary with the susceptibilities of the patient to its in-
fluence.”). 
 172. Id. at 881 (“It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere 
domain of discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and 
connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by 
which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can secure the 
exclusive control of it under the patent laws.”). 
 173. Id. at 882. 
 174. Id. at 884. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969) (arguing that the patent system “would appear 
to worsen . . . the allocation of research resources as between applied research 
on the one hand and basic research on the other”). 
 177. 17 F. Cas. at 882. 
 178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 179. See id. 
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discoveries is patentable—discoveries that, through invention, 
introduce into the world something that did not exist before. 
Natural forces and phenomena already exist; only applications 
of those forces and phenomena are “invented.” There is little 
contemporaneous evidence, but this seems a plausible reading 
of the constitutional language. Section 101 is potentially broad-
er, in the first instance, by defining the class of potential paten-
tees as “[w]hoever invents or discovers . . . .”180 The list of pa-
tentable subject matter that follows includes some things—like 
processes and compositions of matter—that might be “discov-
ered” existing in nature.181 In recent years, the courts have 
treated the terms of § 101 in a broadly literal sense.182 On the 
other hand, part of their authority for doing so has been the 
statement in the Committee Reports that the patent laws could 
extend to “everything under the sun that is made by man.”183 
2. Altruistic Motives 
It would hardly be satisfying to draw a statutory line be-
tween nature and patentable inventions without a rationale to 
excuse the injustice to some of society’s greatest benefactors or 
the paradoxical effect on the allocation of incentives. One justi-
fication is that higher interests than monetary reward motivate 
the great theorists like Einstein and Faraday.184 Yet if scien-
tists of Einstein’s caliber were indifferent to financial gain, it 
would seem unnecessary to create rules that denied them pa-
tents they did not seek. Let us assume, therefore, that some of 
 
 180. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Con-
gress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject mat-
ter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress em-
ployed. . . . Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when 
congressional objectives require broad terms.”). 
 183. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis added); H.R. 
REP. NO. 82-1923, supra note 30, at 6 (emphasis added).  
 184. See Dickey-john Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 
(7th Cir. 1983) (noting that it has never “been considered that the lure of 
commercial reward provided by a patent was needed to encourage such contri-
butions [as Einstein’s]”); Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 
(2d Cir. 1944) (“Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like Faraday 
care little for monetary rewards; generally the motives of such outstanding 
geniuses are not pecuniary. Perhaps (although no one really knows) the same 
cannot be said of those lesser geniuses who put such discoveries to practical 
uses.” (footnote omitted)). Universities, where much theoretical research takes 
place, may be less affected by the profit motive than other institutions. See 
Turner, supra note 176, at 452. 
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those great explorers of nature might desire, or need for cover-
ing expenses, the kind of financial returns that a patent could 
provide. On the other side of the balance, one could argue that 
the discovery of natural principles is not an activity valuable 
enough to society to warrant monopoly interests; only those 
lesser minds who apply natural principles to the “mundane 
problems of everyday existence”185 actually enhance our ma-
terial welfare. Clearly that has not been the reasoning of the 
courts, nor would it represent a broad view of how discovery 
benefits society, even in the most utilitarian respects. Moreo-
ver, it would be inconsistent to dismiss the value of a discovery 
at the same time one protests limits on its exploitation by any-
one but the discoverer. 
3. Natural Rights 
One could argue instead that exclusive rights to natural 
phenomena or principles in the abstract, even awarded to their 
discoverers, would impose too much upon the natural rights of 
others. In a copyright context, one court called ideas expressed 
in nature “the common heritage of humankind.”186 Similarly, 
the Commissioner in Ex parte Latimer187 found that “nature 
has intended [its products] to be equally for the use of all 
men.”188 Even without personifying nature and giving it inten-
tions, one can reasonably view nature, in its more abstract 
forms, as a resource held in common by all. Jefferson, in a fam-
ous passage, expressed similar views about ideas: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an 
idea . . . . That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the 
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement 
of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently de-
signed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all 
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in 
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation.189 
Jefferson reasoned that ideas, and therefore inventions, 
“cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”190 Nevertheless, 
 
 185. Dickey-john, 710 F.2d at 348 n.9. 
 186. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 187. 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123 (1889). 
 188. Id. at 126. 
 189. VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180–81 (H.A. Washington 
ed., 1871) quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 
(1966). 
 190. Id. at 9 n.2. 
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Jefferson concluded that society, for its own benefit, might 
grant exclusive rights to the profits arising from inventions “as 
an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce 
utility.”191 One could say the same of natural principles or phe-
nomenon; they are held in common as a matter of right, but so-
ciety for its convenience may award to the discoverers the prof-
its derived from their useful exploitation. Why has it failed to 
do so? 
4. Novelty 
Some courts supply the missing element by emphasizing 
novelty—always one of the most fundamental considerations in 
separating the patentable from the unpatentable. The benefit 
of the inventions that patents encourage must be weighed 
against the costs that patents impose on society. When a patent 
claims novel subject matter, the trade-off is generally positive; 
society can accept restrictions on the use of an invention that 
otherwise would not exist at all. Nevertheless, if the patent 
claims something that is not new—something that society al-
ready possessed—the costs of the patent are unjustified. That is 
the reason that all patent claims must meet the standard of 
novelty, embodied in § 102 of the Patent Act.192 In that provi-
sion, “[s]ociety, speaking through Congress and the courts, has 
said ‘thou shalt not take it away.’”193 
A phenomenon discovered in nature is not new, except in 
the sense that it was previously unknown. In 1928, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals held invalid a patent claiming a duc-
tile form of tungsten, important because it could be drawn into 
thin wires for use in electric light bulbs.194 Although the paten-
tee, Coolidge, had been “first to uncover it and bring it into 
view,”195 and although he had converted it from the impure 
form in which it could be found in the earth, the property on 
which he relied was a characteristic of the metal.196 “Natural-
ly,” wrote the court, “we inquire who created pure tungsten. 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 193. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 194. Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 641–44 (3d Cir. 
1928). 
 195. Id. at 642. 
 196. Id. at 643 (“What he discovered were natural qualities of pure 
tungsten. Manifestly he did not create pure tungsten, nor did he create its 
characteristics. These were created by nature . . . .”).  
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Coolidge? No. It existed in nature and doubtless has existed 
there for centuries. The fact that no one before Coolidge found 
it there does not negate its origin or existence.”197 More recent 
cases extend the reasoning to scientific principles, like New-
ton’s laws of gravitation, that also exist in nature before they 
are discovered.198 
Section 101 does specify “new and useful” processes, ma-
chines, manufactures and compositions of matter,199 which bol-
sters the argument that natural principles or phenomena are 
unpatentable subject matter. On the other hand, as discussed 
in Part II.C, in other contexts the courts have denied that no-
velty, generally within the province of § 102, plays any part in 
determining what is patentable subject matter under § 101.200 
Moreover, the issue of dispossessing the public arises primarily 
where the utility does not depend on understanding the phe-
nomenon. In other words, it would be highly objectionable for 
the discoverer of oxygen to deprive humanity of the use of fire, 
but less objectionable for Coolidge to deprive humanity of the 
use of ductile tungsten. Fire had been used successfully for 
thousands of years; ductile tungsten had not been used at all 
because its existence had not been suspected until Coolidge dis-
covered it.201 Coolidge’s patent would not have “deprived [the 
public] of any rights that it theretofore freely enjoyed.”202 
 
 197. Id. Today a court may well grant a patent on a purified form of a nat-
ural substance if that purified form does not occur in nature. See Schering 
Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re 
Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). In such cases the subject 
matter of the claim is novel. 
 198. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (citing PETER 
D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 13 (1975)); see also Arrhythmia 
Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1066 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (“A law of nature, even if a process, is not ‘new’ 
within the meaning of § 101.”); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 
(“The Supreme Court has recognized that scientific principles and laws of na-
ture, even when for the first time discovered, have existed throughout time, 
define the relationship of man to his environment, and, as a consequence, 
ought not to be the subject of exclusive rights of any one person.” (citing Leroy 
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175 (1852))). 
 199. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).  
 200. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (“The question 
therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from 
whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quot-
ing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)) (emphasis omitted)).  
 201. See Gen. Elec. Co., 28 F.2d at 642–43 (“Coolidge took tungsten as it 
‘existed’ . . . and by his process converted it into pure tungsten or tungsten 
that is substantially pure, and, doubtless, was first to discover that when pure 
it has characteristics . . . which are wholly different from the characteristics of 
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5. Overbreadth 
Another reason for excluding natural phenomena might be 
that claims to such phenomena are overly broad. Much of the 
value, and burden, of the patent monopoly depends on the 
breadth of the claims. Narrow claims may be easily avoided; 
broad claims may encompass large areas of economic activity, 
casting a forbidding shadow over future innovations and in-
creasing our reluctance to recognize exclusive rights. The objec-
tion to Morse’s claim 8 was primarily one of overbreadth.203 
Covering any means for employing electromagnetism to trans-
mit characters at a distance, even ones much different than 
Morse’s own, it would have imposed too much on the “onward 
march of science.”204 Benson relies on the same theme.205 Be-
cause Benson claimed his invention in terms of mathematics, 
his patent would have covered a vast array of potential applica-
tions, including some not yet discovered.206 
In comparison to an invention described as an application 
of a natural principle, an invention claimed as the principle it-
self is a step further removed from any specific utility. It is by 
nature more abstract and broader in scope. On the other hand, 
the discovery of a natural principle might be considered a more 
significant discovery, deserving of more substantial rewards.207 
If Benson’s mathematics could be employed in so many fields, 
 
the impure oxid of tungsten, notable among which is extreme brittleness.”).  
 202. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15 (citing PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS 13 (1975)).  
 203. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–13 (1854) (“[Morse] 
claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the 
electric or galvanic current.”). 
 204. Id. at 113. 
 205. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’ 
claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of 
the BCD to pure binary conversion.”). 
 206. See id. at 71 (“It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in 
practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD 
numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case.”). 
 207. With some sense of irony, courts often contrast groundbreaking, inva-
luable, but unpatentable discoveries in natural science with humble, incre-
mental, but patentable advancements in technology. See, e.g., Katz v. Horni 
Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[The] plaintiff has 
achieved a real invention . . . which satisfied the strictest standards employed 
by the Supreme Court.”); Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 884 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (noting that patents may be granted to “very 
humble contrivances, of limited usefulness, the fruits of indifferent skill, and 
trifling ingenuity,” but not to a discovery as “brilliant and useful” as anesthe-
sia). 
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perhaps his was a “broad discovery” meriting claims to match. 
Broad claims, generally speaking, are not disqualified as pa-
tentable subject matter, though they must pass muster under 
the enablement and written description requirements.208 Some 
“pioneering inventions,”209 those that open up vast new possi-
bilities, receive broad claims without demur. In any event, the 
relatively brief duration of the patent term eliminates the star-
tling prospect of Samuel Morse’s claim 8 covering such ad-
vanced technologies as fax machines and text messaging.210 
Even if some advancements occurred during the life of his pa-
tent, subsequent inventors would not be powerless. They could 
patent their own discoveries, after which anyone desiring to 
practice the advancement would need the permission of both 
Morse, the inventor of the basic principle, and the subsequent 
inventor who had improved upon it—perhaps an awkward sit-
uation, but not an impossible one. 
6. Tools of Research 
Courts also warn against patenting the fundamental re-
sources necessary for research. In Funk Brothers, the Supreme 
Court described as “the work of nature” the non-inhibiting 
qualities of the bacteria combined by the patentee, and found 
that “[t]he qualities of these bacteria . . . are part of the store-
house of knowledge of all men.”211 In Benson, the Court held 
natural phenomena unpatentable because “they are the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work.”212 If patents are in-
tended to foster technological progress, perhaps it would be 
 
 208. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and us-
ing it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”). 
 209. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The concept of the ‘pioneer’ arises from an ancient jurispru-
dence, reflecting judicial appreciation that a broad breakthrough invention 
merits a broader scope of equivalents than does a narrow improvement in a 
crowded technology.”). 
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing the duration of a patent term). 
 211. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 212. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also Nippon Elec. 
Glass Co. v. Sheldon, 539 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the “ba-
sic tools” language in a case where the patentee had discovered unsafe levels 
of radiation emitted by some television sets). 
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counterproductive to burden with legal restrictions the “basic 
tools” necessary for research. 
The same concern arises in the context of the utility re-
quirement.213 In Brenner v. Manson,214 Manson developed a 
process to produce a steroid similar to one known to have tu-
mor-inhibiting effects in mice.215 Manson’s steroid had no dem-
onstrated use, although it was a candidate for further re-
search.216 The Supreme Court held this insufficient to satisfy 
the utility requirement.217 An inability to patent the process 
might discourage its disclosure, but “a more compelling consid-
eration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which has 
not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, 
creates a monopoly of knowledge.”218 Like the monopolies 
feared in Morse and Benson, it could encumber a boundless ter-
ritory of further research: 
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product 
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not 
capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and 
perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block 
off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating bene-
fit to the public.219 
The “basic tools” argument is dubious. As Judge Rader re-
cently pointed out in a dissenting opinion,220 an improved mi-
croscope can be patented even though it is “tool of research.”221 
No one knows what studies might be conducted with an im-
proved microscope or what practical discoveries it might facili-
tate; microscopes are valuable because they bring researchers 
“one step closer” to countless useful things.222 If patents on mi-
 
 213. Section 101 states that a patentable invention must be “new and use-
ful.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).  
 214. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
 215. Id. at 522.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 531 (“[Plaintiff ] begins with the . . . argument that his process 
has a specific utility which would entitle him to a declaration of interference 
even under the Patent Office’s reading of § 101 . . . . We do not accept any of 
these theories as an adequate basis for overriding the determination of the Pa-
tent Office that the ‘utility’ requirement has not been met.”). 
 218. Id. at 534. 
 219. Id.; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]n 
addition to providing a ‘substantial’ utility, an asserted use must also show 
that that claimed invention can be used to provide a well-defined and particu-
lar benefit to the public.”). 
 220. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380–82 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1381 (“[T]he microscope . . . has ‘utility’ under § 101. Why? Be-
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croscopes were forbidden, one would expect fewer resources to 
be devoted to their development, and advancements in micro-
scope technology might be kept secret by those who could pa-
tent only what the instrument revealed. The effect would be to 
deny researchers the tools needed for technological advance-
ment—a situation inconsistent with the progress of the useful 
arts. Similarly, natural phenomena, though not reduced to 
practical utility, may bring researchers “one step closer.” Disal-
lowing patents to natural laws and phenomena might withhold 
necessary incentives at the very point where they are most 
needed, while failing to protect those willing to share their dis-
coveries. These points, raised by Justice Harlan’s opinion in 
Brenner,223 failed to carry the day in the context of utility, and 
presumably would not persuade the courts in the context of pa-
tentable subject matter. 
II.  PROCESSES BASED ON OBSERVING NATURE   
The preceding discussion suggests that observations of na-
ture turned to practical use—removed “from the laboratory of 
the philosopher, and ma[de] it the servant of man”224—are pa-
tentable subject matter. But when applying a principle of na-
ture means observing and drawing conclusions, additional is-
sues arise, including the meaning of “process” in § 101 and the 
status of “mental steps” as patentable subject matter.225 
A. THE MEANING OF “PROCESS” 
Section 100(b) of the Patent Act226 states that “‘process’ 
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, 
or material.”227 Even when the Act referred to “arts” alone, the 
courts viewed processes as patentable subject matter.228 The 
 
cause it takes the researcher one step closer to answering . . . [important] 
questions. Each step, even if small in isolation, is nonetheless a benefit to so-
ciety sufficient to give a viable research tool ‘utility’ under § 101.”). 
 223. See 383 U.S. at 537–39 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 224. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1854) (Grier, J., dissent-
ing). 
 225. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 226. Id. § 100(b). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722 (1881) (“That a patent 
can be granted for a process there can be no doubt. The patent law is not con-
fined to new machines and new compositions of matter, but extends to any 
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courts struggled at first with the incorporeal nature of 
processes as compared to physical materials. In Tilghman, the 
Supreme Court drew the customary line between an unpatent-
able principle and a patentable application of that principle, 
contrasting Morse’s claim 8 to Neilson’s hot-blast furnace.229 An 
inventor, it held, could not patent an effect, but only a specific 
“means” through which that effect might be produced.230 The 
“means” might be a process rather than a machine.231 Processes 
differ from machines in that a process is a fleeting series of 
events—not, like a machine, an enduring concrete object.232 Be-
cause a process does not depend on specific machinery, a 
process is something of an abstraction,233 but still capable of 
serving as a patentable “means.”234 
A few years before, in Cochrane v. Deener,235 the Court es-
tablished the principle that new processes are patentable even 
if they can be performed with existing machinery.236 The paten-
tee’s process involved the separation and regrinding of “mid-
dlings” in order to produce high-quality flour. The most famous 
language in the opinion is this description of a “process”: 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a 
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the sub-
ject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of ma-
chinery.237 
A process that “transform[s]” materials and “reduce[s]” 
them “to a different state or thing”—like the grinding process 
 
new and useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is clearly an art, 
within the meaning of the law.”). 
 229. See id. at 724–27. 
 230. Id. at 728. 
 231. Id. The opinion includes a number of statements that are difficult to 
fathom, including the observation that “[a] new process is usually the result of 
a discovery; a machine of invention.” Id. at 722. 
 232. See id. at 722. 
 233. See In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 381 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (noting that a 
process “is so far abstract that it is capable of contemplation by the mind apart 
from any one of the specific instruments by which it is performed” (citation 
omitted)). 
 234. See id. A patent claim describing a machine is also an abstraction—a 
description of a class of machines that satisfy the claim language. By contrast-
ing the concrete nature of a machine as an embodiment and the abstract na-
ture of a process as an idea, Tilghman understates the abstractness of the 
former. 
 235. 94 U.S. 780 (1877). 
 236. Id. at 787–88. 
 237. Id. at 788. 
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that transforms flour from coarse to fine—has a physicality 
comparable to that of an apparatus.238 It is not a theory, but a 
material transformation. Some courts have implied that only 
such processes are patentable subject matter.239 Others have 
warned against misconstruing the language in Cochrane, first 
offered to support an expansive view of what a process can be, 
as a definition or limitation.240 In today’s environment of soft-
ware and business method patents,241 a clear definition of 
“process” is more important than ever. Contrary to the general 
trend toward the expansion of patentable subject matter into 
the realm of intangibles, in 2007 the Federal Circuit held that a 
process satisfies § 101 only if “it is embodied in, operates on, 
transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory 
subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”242 A process not tied in such a way to a physical phe-
nomenon, said the court, is an “abstract” idea, unpatentable 
under Benson, even if it has a practical application.243 Benson 
does not require a reading of “abstract” that would deny pa-
tents to incorporeal processes practically applied in the solution 
of specific problems; the algorithm rejected as unpatentable 
subject matter in Benson was not directed to any specific appli-
cation, a point emphasized by the Court in rejecting the pa-
tent.244 Hence, the adoption by the Federal Circuit of this nar-
row definition of “process” is a surprising one, concurrent with 
a similar shift in its treatment of mental steps as potentially 
patentable subject matter. 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. See, e.g., In re Yuan, 188 F.2d at 381 (noting that a process “consists 
in the application of physical force through physical agents to physical objects” 
(citation omitted)); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 
817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944), aff ’d, 326 U.S. 696 (1946), reh’g granted, 327 U.S. 812 
(1946), opinion set aside by 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Meinhardt, 1907 Dec. 
Comm’r Pat. 237, 238. 
 240. E.g., In re Prater (Prater II), 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In 
Benson, the Supreme Court added to the confusion. At one point, the Court 
stated that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include 
particular machines.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). Later, in 
response to the argument that a process claim, not linked to particular ma-
chines, must perform a transformation, the Court employed this triple-
negative: “[w]e do not hold that no process claim could ever qualify if it did not 
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.” Id. at 71. 
 241. See infra Part II.D. 
 242. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 243. Id. at 1377. 
 244. See 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
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B. THE MENTAL STEPS DOCTRINE 
A further obstacle to patenting an invention based on ob-
servations of nature is the venerable mental steps doctrine.245 
A series of cases in the 1940s established that purely mental 
acts do not qualify as patentable subject matter. The court in In 
re Heritage246 addressed an invention that consisted of testing 
the amount of coating that could be applied to fiber boards 
without impairing their noise-absorbing qualities.247 The user 
of the method applied progressively greater amounts of coating 
to samples of the board and selected the optimum coating based 
on the results.248 The only novel aspect of the method was “the 
mental process of making a selection,” which the court held to 
be unpatentable subject matter.249 In Halliburton the patentee 
devised an improved method for determining the distance to 
the fluid surface in an oil well using reflected sound.250 The 
claims used words such as “counting,” “observing,” “measur-
ing,” “comparing,” and “computing.”251 The court found the in-
vention, in essence, to be a series of mental steps, and unpa-
tentable using the definition of “process” advanced in 
Cochrane.252 The observations, computations, and comparisons 
described did not transform any material substance into a dif-
ferent state or thing.253 Ex parte Toth,254 involving another oil-
field invention, confirmed that mental steps “can be given no 
patentable weight.”255 
While the rejection of purely mental acts as patentable sub-
ject matter seemed unequivocal,256 at least two questions re-
mained. One was whether a process that combined mental and 
physical steps could be patented. A second was whether acts 
 
 245. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[6] (2006).  
 246. 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945). 
 247. Id. at 554–55. 
 248. Id. at 556. 
 249. Id. 
 250. 146 F.2d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1944). 
 251. Id. at 821. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1944). 
 255. Id. at 132. 
 256. See In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (noting that it has 
been “thoroughly established by decisions of various courts that purely mental 
steps do not form a process which falls within the scope of patentability as de-
fined by statute”). 
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that could be carried out either in the mind or by a machine 
could be patented.  
In 1951, the United States Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA) addressed the first question in In re Ab-
rams.257 The applicant invented a process for identifying petro-
leum deposits by measuring the flow rate of certain gasses into 
a bore hole and comparing the results to a benchmark figure.258 
The applicant proposed three “rules of law” to settle perceived 
confusion in the mental steps cases.259 Rule one stated that a 
process is unpatentable subject matter if all of the steps are 
“purely mental in character.”260 Rule two stated that if a 
process includes some mental steps, and “the alleged novelty or 
advance over the art resides in one or more of [those] steps,” 
then the process is unpatentable.261 Rule three stated that if 
some steps of the process are mental steps and others physical 
steps, but the novelty resides in the physical steps, then the 
combination is patentable subject matter.262 The rules “ap-
pear[ed] to accord” with the case law, but the court found it un-
necessary to decide anything further than the applicant’s fail-
ure to qualify under proposed Rule 3.263 
In the first Prater opinion264 of 1968, Judge Smith of the 
CCPA challenged the conventional wisdom in several respects. 
First, he cast doubt on the origins of the mental steps doctrine, 
pointing out that in one of its earliest manifestations, the 
claimed invention had failed the novelty test, rendering the 
subject matter question moot.265 Second, he rejected the Coch-
rane definition of “process”—the surest ground for excluding 
mental steps from § 101.266 When Cochrane refers to a process 
as “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-
matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
 
 257. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
 258. Id. at 165.  
 259. Id. at 166. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 167. 
 264. In re Prater (Prater I), 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), reh’g granted, 
160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 230 (C.C.P.A. 1969), opinion superseded by 415 F.2d 1393 
(C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 265. Id. at 1387 (referring to Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 
1932)). 
 266. Id. at 1387–88. 
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thing,”267 the court’s intention, said Judge Smith, was not to 
limit what a process could be but to expand it beyond the con-
fines of specific machinery.268 Third, Judge Smith dismissed the 
Abrams “rules” as propositions without judicial sanction.269 If 
the Abrams court embraced the rules at all, it was only for pur-
poses of argument, to demonstrate that the applicant would fail 
even if the proposed rules were adopted.270 Finally, Judge 
Smith distinguished Abrams on the ground that the invention 
in the earlier case included steps that could only be performed 
in the mind.271 In contrast, the applicant in Prater I invented a 
method of choosing certain peaks in a spectrograph to achieve 
accurate measurements, and all of the steps could be performed 
by machinery that the applicant disclosed.272 As far as Judge 
Smith could determine, Congress had not denied patents to me-
thods that might be performed, but did not have to be per-
formed, in the human mind.273 The sole caveat was that the 
method must be “directed to an industrial technology—a ‘useful 
art’ within the intendment of the Constitution.”274 
Judge Smith’s Prater I opinion was important but short-
lived. The CCPA granted a petition for rehearing, and in 1969 
issued the second Prater opinion.275 This time, the court re-
jected the claims as indefinite.276 An application must include 
claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”277 
Here the applicant regarded his invention as one limited to ma-
chines, but the claims failed to reflect his intentions.278 The 
 
 267. Id. at 1387 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1877)). 
 268. Id. at 1387–88. 
 269. Id. at 1386. 
 270. Id. at 1371 (viewing the Abrams rules adopted by the court as a “mis-
reading” of the case that leads to “confusion”). 
 271. Id. at 1389. 
 272. See id. at 1379. 
 273. Id. at 1389. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Prater II, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 276. See id. at 1396–97. 
 277. Id. at 1404 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 278. Id. Today this seems an odd use of the definiteness requirement. A 
claim is indefinite under § 112 of the Patent Act if persons skilled in the art 
cannot understand its scope. See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia 
Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 336 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here 
the court understood the claim perfectly well and found that it read on mental 
activity. See Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1405. The claim might have failed the writ-
ten description requirement if the applicant had not been in possession of such 
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opinion duplicates portions of Judge Smith’s earlier efforts, in-
cluding the warning against treating Cochrane’s process de-
scription as a limitation.279 Again, the court distinguished Ab-
rams as a case in which the claimed process could only be 
performed through mental steps.280 Although the court declined 
to analyze the mental steps doctrine in detail,281 and much of 
what it did say can be dismissed as dicta, the opinion marked a 
significant shift. Because Abrams and the earlier cases pre-
dated the 1952 Patent Act,282 the court concluded that 
“[w]hether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes 
within the bounds of ‘process’ . . . is . . . an issue which has nev-
er been squarely decided.”283 
The retreat continued the following year with In re Mu-
sgrave,284 where the applicant invented a method of analyzing 
seismograms.285 The Patent Office rejected the claims, finding 
that mental steps were the only steps recited, or, in claims that 
also recited physical steps, the only source of novelty.286 On ap-
peal, the CCPA observed that nothing in the Patent Act specifi-
cally excludes, or includes, mental steps within the definition of 
a statutory process.287 The case law it found “something of a 
morass,” the term “mental step” having no clear meaning, nor 
any definite legal significance.288 A physical process, the court 
held, is not unpatentable merely because the human operator 
must think, nor is a process to be performed by a machine dis-
qualified because it might also be performed by a person.289 As 
for the Abrams rules, the court found rules two and three to be 
“logically unsound.”290 Whether a process qualifies as patenta-
ble subject matter cannot depend on where the novelty lies; 
 
a broad invention when the application was filed. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond 
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But the applicant in 
Prater II seemed to have known all along that, theoretically, the method could 
be performed mentally; it simply argued, unsuccessfully, that the claims were 
narrower than that. See 415 F.2d at 1404. 
 279. Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1403. 
 280. Id. at 1401–02. 
 281. Id. at 1403. 
 282. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 283. Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1402 n.23. 
 284. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 888. 
 287. Id. at 890. 
 288. Id. at 890–91. 
 289. Id. at 893. 
 290. Id. at 889. 
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otherwise, the subject-matter status of a process claim could 
change as the art advanced, ceasing to be statutory when the 
physical process steps ceased to be novel.291 “Logically,” the 
court wrote, “the identical process cannot be first within and 
later without the categories of statutory subject matter, de-
pending on such extraneous factors.”292 
If anything remained of the mental steps doctrine, it 
seemed limited to methods that could only be performed in the 
human mind, including judgments based on aesthetics, morals, 
politics, or other “peculiarly human” values.293 Processes de-
pendent on these judgments—a process for selecting the perfect 
drapes for the living room, for example—might exceed the 
scope of the useful arts. Rather than address these inventions 
through the muddied lens of the mental steps doctrine, the 
court devised a useful arts alternative like that proposed in 
Prater I: “[a]ll that is necessary, in our view, to make a se-
quence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 
U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in 
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the 
progress of ‘useful arts.’”294 This new test, Justice Stevens later 
observed, “effectively disposed of any vestiges of the mental-
steps doctrine.”295 Judge Baldwin, concurring in Musgrave, ar-
gued that the new test was unnecessary because the “mental 
steps doctrine” had been so limited by the courts296 that it was 
“no longer a serious problem.”297 
One factor marginalizing the mental steps “problem” was 
that computers soon handled many processes involving calcula-
tions or comparisons. Hence, after Musgrave, attention shifted 
to the “mathematical algorithm” analysis. In Benson the Court 
noted that, theoretically, one could perform the calculations 
with the aid of pencil and paper.298 But because Benson’s 
process was meant to be performed by a computer, the discus-
sion turned to the abstract nature of the calculations even if 
performed by machines.299 
 
 291. See id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See id. at 889 n.4. 
 294. Id. at 893. 
 295. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 296. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 894 (“[T]here is now only a very narrow scope 
to this ‘fearful’ mental steps doctrine.”). 
 297. Id. at 894. 
 298. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 299. In dicta, the Benson Court did list “mental processes” as one of the ex-
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Another reason for the decline of the mental steps doctrine 
may be that it was difficult to justify. In Abrams, the court did 
not even try, declaring it “self-evident that thought is not pa-
tentable.”300 Leaving aside electrochemical processes in the 
brain, mental steps do not transform any physical substance 
into a different state or thing. Yet, as discussed in both Prater 
opinions, Cochrane probably intended no limitation on the 
meaning of “process,”301 nor, in any case, would a Cochrane li-
mitation help us understand the reason for the distinction. 
Some mental processes might fall outside the scope of the use-
ful arts, but others are unquestionably technological.302 A 
thought process might be considered a natural process, and 
therefore excluded from § 101 like other natural phenomena.303 
But novel mental processes are not found in nature; like any 
other novel processes, they must be invented. While Benson in-
cludes mental processes, along with phenomena of nature and 
abstract intellectual concepts, among the “basic tools of scientif-
ic and technological work,”304 the Court did not explain why 
this is so. A process that requires only observation and reflec-
tion is not, necessarily, more fundamental to scientific inquiry 
than a process involving physical steps. Finally, one might ar-
gue that legal restrictions on thought processes are inconsis-
tent with basic freedoms, perhaps those guaranteed under the 
First Amendment.305 This is an intriguing line of inquiry but by 
no means well developed in the mental steps cases. 
 
ceptions to § 101, perhaps signaling that the mental steps doctrine had life in 
it still. 409 U.S. at 67. The similar list in Diehr includes only “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 450 U.S. at 185. 
 300. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
 301. See Prater I, 415 F.2d 1378, 1378–88 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Prater II, 415 
F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969).  
 302. Some of the mental processes identified in Musgrave as “peculiarly 
human” might defy description, raising issues of definiteness. See 431 F.2d at 
893 (“Of course, to obtain a valid patent the claim must also comply with all 
the other provisions of the statute, including definiteness under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112. A step requiring the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction 
might be objectionable as rendering a claim indefinite, but this would provide 
no statutory basis for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). Many claims based 
on mental steps would pose no such difficulty. 
 303. Cf. Prater I, 415 F.2d at 1388–89 (“[A]lthough appellants’ novel calcu-
lations performed in the mind of a man might possibly be considered to be in 
nature, performance of the process of these novel calculations on a computer is 
by ‘a means which had never occurred in nature.’” (citation omitted)). 
 304. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 305. See Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1400 n.20 (“The solicitor . . . argues that the 
grant of a patent containing process claims of such breadth as to confer upon a 
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Although the mental steps doctrine might have been consi-
dered defunct, it experienced an unexpected rebirth in 2007, 
through the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Comiskey.306 The 
claims of the patent application at issue, rejected by the ex-
aminer on grounds of obviousness, concerned a method of con-
ducting a mandatory arbitration involving legal documents.307 
Relying on the unpatentability of “abstract” ideas, as recorded 
in Benson, the court held that purely mental processes, not tied 
to machinery or the physical transformation of matter, are un-
patentable subject matter, even if they are usefully applied.308 
The court invoked the basic tools argument,309 and, interesting-
ly, argued that such purely mental processes exceed the scope 
of the useful arts.310 In other words, the “technological arts” 
consideration offered in Musgrave as a substitute for a discre-
dited mental steps doctrine has now been used to justify its re-
imposition. This development is certain to be controversial, 
both because the intentions of the framers are difficult to apply 
to the intangible technologies of today, and because mental 
processes applied to the solution of practical problems in tech-
nological fields actually might be considered technological 
processes, regardless of their incorporeal nature. 
C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF NOVELTY TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER 
If “mental processes” are out of bounds, inventions based 
on observation of nature may still be patented if allied with 
physical steps preceding, or following, the observation. Because 
such steps are often necessary to enjoy the fruits of the discov-
ery, adding them to the claim is unlikely to limit the economic 
value of the patent. As long as the physical steps in the ex-
panded process are new, the mental component—observing and 
 
patentee the right to exclude others from thinking in a certain manner would 
run afoul of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. He 
urges that Article I, Section 8 must be construed in the light of the other con-
stitutionally assured rights and that freedom of mind or thought may not be 
abridged by the patent laws.”). 
 306. 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 307. See id. at 1368. 
 308. Id. at 1377 (“[M]ental processes—or processes of human thinking—
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application.”). 
 309. See id.; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.  
 310. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1374, 1378–79 (“[T]he patent statute 
does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for their operation 
on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor that both the framers and 
Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter.”). 
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reflecting—should not affect the patentability of the claim; as 
the court said in Musgrave, a process is not unpatentable mere-
ly because the operator must think.311 The problem would arise 
if the physical steps were not new. 
For many years there have been two starkly contrasting 
views of the relationship between patentable subject matter 
and novelty. According to the first view, one must identify, in a 
claim comprising multiple elements, the particular elements 
that distinguish the claim from the prior art.312 Only those 
elements affect the status of the invention under § 101 of the 
Patent Act. This is the approach suggested by proposed rules 
two and three in Abrams.313 The other point of view holds that 
patentable subject matter and novelty are entirely separate re-
quirements,314 making it inappropriate to consider which part 
of the claim is new, or if any part of the claim is new, when ad-
dressing § 101. 
A patent claim is a combination of elements describing an 
apparatus, method, or composition of matter. A product or 
process that includes all of the elements infringes the claim.315 
One could view the claimed combination as a whole as the pa-
tentee’s invention; alternatively, one could view the invention 
as the advancement in the art—the “point of novelty”—most of-
ten recited in just a portion of the claim. Suppose, for example, 
that an inventor discovered an additive that would keep the 
graphite in a pencil from smudging. The claim might begin, “A 
writing implement comprising . . . ,” followed by a list of ele-
ments, many of them old (a shaft of wood, a metal band, a soft 
rubber eraser) and one of them new (a graphite rod with addi-
tive X). One could view the invention as the improved pencil or 
as the additive alone, and one could construct a patent system 
around either approach. Which system we have is a matter of 
debate. 
Section 101 reserves patents to those who “invent” or “dis-
cover” something new within the designated categories of pa-
tentable subject matter.316 Section 112 requires that the claims 
 
 311. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 312. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 313. See In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166, 169 (using suggested “rules of 
law” for the specifics of appellant’s claims). 
 314. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981). 
 315. See Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (citing Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 316. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject mat-
ter that the applicant regards as his invention.”317 This sug-
gests that the invention and the claim language are co-
extensive, and often claims include both old elements and new. 
Section 103, requiring that a patented invention be nonob-
vious,318 is the one provision to hint that some claim elements 
might embody the invention more than others. Section 103 fo-
cuses on the “differences” between the prior art and patented 
invention, differences that might reside in only a portion of the 
claim. However, the differences matter only if they render ob-
vious “the subject matter [sought to be patented] as a whole,”319 
a phrase implying that the invention is more than just the dif-
ferences. Hence, as far as one can determine from the statutory 
language, an applicant’s invention should be considered, for 
most purposes at least, the whole of the combination described 
in the claim.320 The language is not as clear as it could be, and 
on other occasions courts have ignored the plain meaning of the 
statute—for example, by excluding certain processes from 
§ 101.321 
Flook best expresses the view that one must focus on the 
novel features in order to determine if the invention is patenta-
ble subject matter.322 The Court assumed that Flook’s mathe-
matical formula was the only novel aspect of his method, some-
thing that Flook did not deny, and asked whether his discovery 
of the formula made eligible for a patent his “otherwise conven-
tional method.”323 Because only useful applications of natural 
principles can be patented, “[t]he process itself, not merely the 
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.”324 The 
Court rejected, as “exalt[ing] form over substance,” the “notion 
that post-solution activity [i.e., physical steps], no matter how 
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatenta-
 
 317. Id. § 112. 
 318. Id. § 103(a)–(b). 
 319. Id. 
 320. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 n.16 (1978) (“Section 103, by its 
own terms, requires that a determination of obviousness be made by consider-
ing ‘the subject matter as a whole.’ Although this does not necessarily require 
that analysis of what is patentable subject matter under § 101 proceed on the 
same basis, we agree that it should.” (citation omitted)). 
 321. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating 
that mental processes alone are not patentable). 
 322. 437 U.S. at 588. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 591. 
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ble principle [such as Flook’s algorithm] into a patentable 
process.”325 Viewed in this light, Flook’s claim “as a whole” in-
cluded no patentable invention.326 Flook is a difficult opinion to 
interpret, in part because of its ambiguous use of terms such as 
“claim” and “invention.”327 Its clearest lesson is to test the sub-
stance of the invention under § 101, while ignoring any conven-
tional process steps that might be added to the claim. 
Judge Rich of the CCPA, and later of the Federal Circuit, 
expressed the opposing point of view328 through his memorable 
“three doors” analogy: 
Achieving the ultimate goal of a patent . . . [requires] separate keys to 
open in succession the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103. . . . If 
the invention, as the inventor defines it in his claims . . . falls into any 
one of the named categories [of § 101], he is allowed to pass through 
to the second door, which is § 102; “novelty and loss of right to patent” 
is the sign on it. Notwithstanding the words “new and useful” in 
§ 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for novelty 
because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the long-
established administrative practice.329 
Without overruling Flook, the Supreme Court in Diehr 
adopted Judge Rich’s analysis.330 Which aspects of Diehr’s 
process might be novel, if any, did not enter into the subject 
matter determination.331 The claims, the Court held, must not 
be “dissect[ed]” into old and new elements; the claims must be 
 
 325. Id. at 590. 
 326. Id. at 594. The Court found a distinction between patentable subject 
matter and novelty. The Court assumed that the algorithm was novel, but still 
rejected the claim for lack of a patentable invention. See id. at 588, 594. 
 327. See id. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s applica-
tion contains no claim of patentable invention.”). 
 328. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979), dismissed as moot sub 
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The Bergy court found in 
Flook “an unfortunate and apparently unconscious . . . commingling of distinct 
statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated . . . .” Id.  
 329. Id. at 960. But cf. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that cancer-fighting properties inherent 
in cruciferous sprouts are not the invention of something new, as required by 
§ 101). 
 330. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (“The question therefore of 
whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the in-
vention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quoting In re Bergy, 
596 F.2d at 961) (emphasis omitted)). 
 331. Id. at 188–89; cf. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (1970) (“In consi-
dering the patentability of a process consisting of a plurality of steps we think 
it is immaterial to the question whether the combination is a statutory 
‘process’ that individual steps are old. The whole process could be old and yet 
be statutory; a fortiori, it matters not that one or more steps are old.” (empha-
sis omitted)). 
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evaluated as a whole.332 Diehr claimed his invention as a me-
thod of curing rubber—clearly, at that level, a “process” within 
the meaning of § 101.333 Hence, whether or not Diehr’s inven-
tion was new, it easily qualified as patentable subject matter. 
In re Comiskey suggests a change of heart by the Federal 
Circuit. In Comiskey, the court held that “[t]he routine addition 
of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable inven-
tion”—unpatentable in this case because, as a purely mental 
process, it exceeded the scope of patentable subject matter— 
“typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness.”334 In other 
words, an invention barred at the door of patentable subject 
matter but not reviewed for obviousness cannot supply the non-
obviousness element of a combination that is, as a whole, pa-
tentable subject matter. The Diehr Court, one suspects, would 
view that as confusing § 101 of the Patent Act with § 103. Nev-
ertheless, any confusion in this case occurs at the § 103 “door.” 
Because of this, and because Diehr was the Supreme Court’s 
last word on the subject, one would still expect a process com-
bining observation, thought, and physical action to pass scruti-
ny under § 101, even if the only novel aspects of the method 
were, considered independently, unpatentable. 
D. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER IN THE AGE OF INTANGIBLES 
Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable expansion in 
the subject matter one could expect to patent. One development 
responsible for this trend is an increased deference to the appli-
cant’s manner of characterizing the invention. Whereas the 
Court in Flook looked behind the applicant’s claim to discover 
its “substance,” ignoring any physical process steps if they did 
not embody Flook’s contribution to the art,335 the Diehr Court 
accepted the claim as written.336 On its surface, Diehr’s claim 
described an industrial process for curing rubber—patentable 
subject matter even if one requires that a “process” transform 
physical materials into “a different state or thing.”337 After 
 
 332. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. 
 333. See id. at 184 (“[W]e think that a physical and chemical process for 
molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories 
of possibly patentable subject matter . . . . Industrial processes such as this are 
the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our 
patent laws.”). 
 334. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 335. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89, 593–95 (1978). 
 336. See 450 U.S. at 191–93. 
 337. See id. at 182–84. 
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Flook, one would have concluded that a mathematical algo-
rithm cannot be patented, as a matter of principle, even if the 
algorithm were usefully employed in a specific industrial con-
text; Diehr reduced the issue to one of claim drafting. 
A similar shift occurred in even more abstract areas of 
computing, beginning with In re Alappat.338 Alappat invented a 
method of producing smooth lines on a cathode-ray tube dis-
play, such as an oscilloscope, by shading the pixels according to 
a mathematical algorithm.339 Alappat’s algorithm, like Ben-
son’s, involved the manipulation of numbers. But unlike Ben-
son, Alappat claimed his invention as a machine—an improved 
display (or “rasterizer”).340 The claims described the machine as 
a collection of “means” for executing the steps of the algo-
rithm—each “means” consisting of conventional computer 
hardware.341 The Federal Circuit, en banc, determined that a 
reprogrammed general-purpose computer may qualify as a pa-
tentable apparatus, even if mechanically unchanged.342 Al-
though the court fell short of holding that every algorithm 
claimed as an apparatus qualifies under § 101,343 the form of 
the claim occupied much of the court’s attention.344 Subsequent 
cases followed suit. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-
 
 338. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 339. Id. at 1537–38. 
 340. Id. at 1538–39. 
 341. See id. at 1538–39, 1565 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see also 33 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“An element in a claim for a combina-
tion may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function 
without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such 
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). 
 342. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (majority opinion). 
 343. See id. (“[A] computer operating pursuant to software may represent 
patentable subject matter . . . .”). 
 344. See id. In its concluding statements, the court observed that, “a com-
puter, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics.” Id. Judge Archer dep-
lored the majority’s “simplistic” approach. Id. at 1554 (Archer, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Every § 101 analysis, he wrote, “must begin 
with this question: What, if anything, is it that the applicant for a patent ‘in-
vented or discovered?’” Id. at 1557 (citation omitted). In that statement, Judge 
Archer meant something more than  “What does the applicant’s claim say?” 
Judge Archer’s opinion in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), similarly 
resists the idea that the claim alone determines the nature of the invention. 
See id. at 839 (“[I]n answering this inquiry [what did the applicant invent?] 
‘[e]ach invention must be evaluated as claimed: yet semantogenic considera-
tions preclude a determination based solely on words appearing in the 
claims.’” (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982))). 
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ture Financial Group, Inc.,345 the patentee claimed a “data 
processing system” for managing a mutual fund portfolio, pro-
viding centralized resources and tax advantages.346 The paten-
tee invented no new hardware, but because the claim used the 
“means” format, and the patent specification included general 
references to computers, the claim literally described a ma-
chine.347 “A ‘machine,’” the court observed, “is proper statutory 
subject matter under § 101.”348 
Another striking trend has been the Federal Circuit’s em-
phasis on utility, rather than physicality, as the key to patent-
able subject matter. One could treat utility and patentable sub-
ject matter as entirely separate “doors,” to use Judge Rich’s 
analogy, even though § 101 is the source of both require-
ments.349 A novel compound, for example, might qualify as a 
“composition of matter,” but fail the utility requirement be-
cause its inventor had discovered no practical use for it.350 But 
in a number of cases, beginning with Alappat, the Federal Cir-
cuit relied on the production of a “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result” to establish that an invention is patentable subject mat-
ter, rather than an abstract principle.351 
In State Street, the court applied the phrase to the calcula-
tion of mutual fund share prices.352 “Useful” the result certainly 
was; anyone can appreciate the advantage of saving money 
through economies of scale and tax avoidance. However, “con-
crete” is more debatable; the numbers were “concrete” only in 
the sense that the computer calculated them to the last penny. 
“Tangible” is a puzzle; the numbers had a definite meaning, but 
if anything is intangible, in the usual sense of nonphysical, it is 
data representing dollar amounts—symbols corresponding to 
 
 345. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 346.  Id. at 1370. 
 347. Id. at 1371–72. 
 348. Id. at 1372. 
 349. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); cf. id. § 112 (spawning the separate re-
quirements of enablement, best mode, and written description). 
 350. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–30, 532–36 (1966). 
 351. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 352. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d at 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, 
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of ma-
thematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical applica-
tion of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces 
‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed 
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by 
regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”). 
 976 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:933 
 
an abstract medium of exchange. A contemporaneous case, 
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,353 also speaks of a 
“useful, concrete, tangible result,” this time in the context of ob-
taining telephone billing information through Boolean logic.354 
Here the court explains that physicality is just one way to dem-
onstrate that the invention is more than an abstract idea.355 Al-
though the Federal Circuit used the word “tangible,” utility 
seemed to be the key consideration under § 101. As in so many 
other respects, Comiskey marks a reversal. In that case, the 
Federal Circuit held that mental processes alone are not pa-
tentable subject matter even if they are usefully applied.356 It 
remains to be seen whether this signals a more restrictive ap-
plication of the “useful, concrete, and tangible” limitation than 
Alappat or AT&T would suggest. 
The last important trend responsible for the expansion of 
patentable subject matter has been the reluctance of both the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit to limit § 101 without 
specific instructions from Congress. This has led to the demise 
of some limitations that used to represent the conventional 
wisdom. In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court announced that, 
absent a definite signal from Congress, live, human-made mi-
cro-organisms would be considered patentable subject mat-
ter.357 Diehr applied the same approach to use of a programmed 
digital computer.358 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held 
that methods of doing business are not disqualified as patenta-
ble processes; they are subject to the same patentability re-
quirements as any other process or method.359 The Patent Of-
fice has found that the Patent Act does not limit patentable 
subject matter even to the technological arts—the “useful Arts” 
 
 353. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 354. See id. at 1358. 
 355. Id. (“The notion of ‘physical transformation’ . . . . is not an invariable 
requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may 
bring about a useful application.” (emphasis added)). 
 356. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he applica-
tion of human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of 
itself patentable.”). 
 357. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 314–18 (1980). 
 358. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). 
 359. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived 
[business method] exception to rest. . . . Since the 1952 Patent Act, business 
methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal require-
ments for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”). 
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in the Constitution.360 On the last point at least, it appears that 
the Federal Circuit is pushing back. In Comiskey, the court 
held that exclusively mental processes are beyond the scope of 
the “useful arts” intended by Congress and the Framers, to be 
the subject matter of patent law.361 
Against this background, a technique combining observa-
tion of nature and useful physical action seems a plausible can-
didate for a patent. Such an invention is not one of philosophi-
cal inquiry, or a natural principle in the abstract; it is a 
principle applied to practical ends. Because the claim will be 
viewed as a whole for purposes of the § 101 analysis, it should 
not matter whether the physical steps are old or new. Although 
Comiskey raises doubts on that score,362 the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Diehr should trump them. With proper claim draft-
ing, the discoverer of any natural relationship usefully applied 
might expect to patent the discovery—until recently. In his 
LabCorp opinion, Justice Breyer cast doubt on the patentability 
of inventions based on useful observations of nature.363 
E. THE LABCORP OPINION AND ITS PREDECESSORS 
Gathering information about the things around us can be a 
matter of purely academic interest, but in other contexts infor-
mation is a highly practical commodity. The fact that informa-
tion is useful, however, does not overcome the § 101 problem if 
one tries to patent the information itself. Some information, 
such as the location of a petroleum deposit or the condition of a 
patient, exists in nature; to reveal that information is not to in-
vent it. On the other hand, one might invent processes or ma-
chines that take advantage of the information in a new way. 
These should be patentable as natural phenomena usefully ap-
plied.  
Many of the cases discussing patentable subject matter 
deal with observations of natural phenomena. In Diehr, for ex-
ample, the rubber-curing process depended on observing tem-
peratures inside the mold and understanding the natural rela-
tionship between those temperatures and the condition of the 
 
 360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1385, 1386–88 (B.P.A.I. 2005). 
 361. See 499 F.3d at 1378–79. 
 362. See id. 1378–81. 
 363. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 
2921, 2926–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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rubber.364 One difficulty in such cases lies in separating the 
phenomenon itself from the machine or process sought to be pa-
tented. When computers process the data obtained through ob-
servation, Benson’s mathematical algorithm exception adds an 
additional layer of complexity. 
Several cases involving observation and analysis of natural 
phenomena for patient diagnosis produced mixed results. In re 
Meyer365 concerned a process and apparatus, described in ab-
stract terms, for testing the elements of a complex system and 
correlating the results to identify a malfunction.366 An intended 
use was as a computer-based diagnostic aid for a neurologist 
running a battery of tests on a patient—an aid supplementing 
the neurologist’s own memory and processes of deduction.367 
The court determined that the invention was a “mathematical 
algorithm representing a mental process,” divorced from any 
physical elements or process steps.368 Without reference 
to Musgrave, which had seemingly dispensed with the mental 
steps doctrine,369 the court held the invention beyond the scope 
of § 101.370 In re Grams371 similarly involved a method for test-
ing the elements of a complex system and analyzing the results 
to identify abnormalities.372 The claims limited the invention to 
the diagnosis of abnormalities in human patients based on the 
results of laboratory tests.373 Again the court found that the 
analysis constituted nothing more than an unpatentable ma-
thematical algorithm374 even when combined with physical 
steps for gathering data.375 In contrast, the court in Arrhythmia 
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.376 held patentable 
 
 364. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–79 (1981). 
 365. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 366. See id. at 790. 
 367. Id. at 793, 795. 
 368. Id. at 796. 
 369. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 370. See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795–96. 
 371. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 372. Id. at. 836. 
 373. Id. at 836–37. 
 374. Id. at 840–41. 
 375. Id. at 839–40. The court noted, “Given that the method of solving a 
mathematical equation may not be the subject of patent protection, it follows 
that the addition of the old and necessary antecedent steps of establishing 
values for the variables in the equation cannot convert the unpatentable me-
thod to patentable subject matter.” Id. at 839 (quoting In re Christensen, 478 
F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 376. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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a method of analyzing electrocardiograph signals to identify a 
patient’s susceptibility to ventricular tachycardia.377 In this 
case, the invention was not too abstract for § 101 because the 
inputs were “not abstractions; they [were] related to the pa-
tient’s heart function.”378 The output also was “not an abstract 
number, but . . . a signal related to the patient’s heart activi-
ty.”379 Indeed, the method was one of physical process steps be-
cause it “transform[ed] one physical, electrical signal into 
another,”380 potentially an argument for bringing any comput-
er-implemented calculation into the realm of physical 
processes. 
The LabCorp situation is in some respects much simpler 
because it does not involve a mathematical algorithm, nor an 
invention described in vacuously abstract terms. The patentee 
claimed a process for diagnosing a deficiency in two B vitamins 
by observing in a patient’s blood an elevated level of the amino 
acid homocysteine.381 Claim 13 read: “A method for detecting a 
deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals com-
prising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level 
of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total 
homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin 
or folate.382 
The district court, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, held the 
defendant liable for inducing infringement by encouraging doc-
tors to order the necessary tests.383 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the patent “claim[ed] a mono-
poly over a basic scientific relationship”—the relationship be-
tween homocysteine and the vitamin deficiency.384 Later the 
Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.385 Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented.386 
A successful patent policy, wrote Justice Breyer, requires 
judicious balancing.387 Against the monetary incentives to in-
ventors one must weigh the costs imposed on others; “some-
 
 377. Id. at 1054–55, 1060–61. 
 378. Id. at 1059. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2921 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 382. Id. at 2924. 
 383. Id. at 2921. 
 384. Id. at 2922. 
 385. Id. at 2921. 
 386. Id. 
 387. See id. at 2929. 
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times too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”388 By raising 
costs and interposing complex legal issues, patents can discou-
rage research and the free exchange of information.389 One of 
the ways in which patent law maneuvers between the “oppos-
ing and risky shoals” of overprotection and underprotection is 
through the rules of patentable subject matter.390 The exclusion 
of scientific truths and natural phenomena preserves from mo-
nopoly the “basic tools of scientific and technological work”—a 
part of the “storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men.”391 Be-
cause they are so fundamental, patents on natural principles 
and phenomena, like copyrights on ideas, would create vast op-
portunities for rent seeking and enormous transaction costs.392 
The law withholds patent protection even though discoveries 
about the natural world may be difficult, expensive, time-
consuming, dependent on monetary incentives, and a “great 
benefit to the human race.”393 
Justice Breyer admitted that the line drawing can be chal-
lenging.394 Many patentable inventions begin with an under-
standing of the natural world.395 But this case, he found, was 
not difficult.396 The relationship between elevated homocysteine 
levels and deficiencies in colabamin and folate is a natural 
phenomenon, and it remains so even when “packag[ed],” by the 
claim language, in the form of a process.397 The process does 
not “transform” the blood of the patient subject to the test; the 
process simply requires the physician to “(1) obtain test results 
and (2) think about them.”398 Moreover, even if diagnosing a vi-
tamin deficiency could be considered a “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result,” Justice Breyer warned that this language had 
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court, nor, if taken liter-
 
 388. Id. at 2922. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 2923 (citations omitted). 
 392. Id. at 2922−23 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003)). 
 393. Id. at 2922. 
 394. Id. at 2926. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 2927 (stating that the invention in this case was “not at the 
boundary”). 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 2009] INEVITABLE INFRINGEMENT 981 
 
ally, would it be consistent with Morse, Benson, or Flook.399 The 
patentee’s attempt to restate a natural law in the language of a 
process produced only “an instruction to read some numbers in 
light of medical knowledge.”400 Justice Breyer called the corre-
lation between homocysteine and the vitamin deficiency a 
“natural phenomenon” and found “nothing in claim 13 that 
adds anything more of significance.”401 
With all respect to Justice Breyer, the situation was more 
complicated than he admitted, for three reasons. First, the step 
of “assaying” implies a physical process. Even if the process is 
not new or patentable, Diehr suggests that it cannot be ignored; 
rather, the claim must be viewed “as a whole,” and the inclu-
sion of some steps that might, by themselves, be nonstatutory 
does not change the character of the overall process under 
§ 101.402 Second, the claim does not describe the natural rela-
tionship between homocysteine and vitamins per se, but a way 
of applying the natural relationship to diagnose the condition of 
a patient. It is overlooking a great deal to say simply that claim 
13 “amount[s] to a simple natural correlation.”403 
Finally, the justifications that Justice Breyer provides for 
the exclusion of patents on natural principles have little force 
as applied to claim 13. A patent that claimed the law of gravity 
would be of enormous scope because gravity is operative in so 
many contexts. Even a patent on the natural relationship be-
tween homocysteine and certain B vitamins could cover a “basic 
tool of research,” if we imagine that the relationship might be 
employed in medical treatments, improved vitamin supple-
ments, or tests for related conditions. Indeed, one could gene-
ralize so far as to say that any natural principle or phenomenon 
is a “basic tool of research.” But here the claim applies the rela-
 
 399. Id. at 2928. If one took “tangible” literally, the standard would be con-
sistent with Flook and Benson. In each case the result of the process was a 
number—an intangible thing—and the Court denied the patent. Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In 
Morse, the description of the invention in the broadest, vaguest claim was less 
than “concrete.” O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). The cases 
where a literal reading of “useful, concrete and tangible” actually seems incon-
sistent with the result are some of the very cases relying on the phrase. See, 
e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 400. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2928. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
 403. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2928. 
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tionship to a specific purpose—diagnosing a vitamin deficien-
cy.404 Diagnosis might be important to research; obviously it is 
important to patient care. The patent might raise the costs of 
health care, limit the use of an important technique, encourage 
rent seeking, encumber physicians with legal problems and 
transaction costs, and all the rest. However, compare claim 13 
to a hypothetical patent on a medical imaging device, like a 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. MRI scanners 
have at least the same potential as tools of research, if not 
more, and they make enormous contributions to healthcare. A 
patent on the scanner would carry the same kinds of penalties 
as a patent on the method of diagnosis. Yet there is no question 
that an MRI scanner would qualify as patentable subject mat-
ter under § 101, and it is unlikely that Justice Breyer would 
find a patent on a scanner objectionable as a matter of policy. 
In short, generalizing that seems plausible, if unproven, when 
comparing natural laws in the abstract to machinery and other 
applications of natural laws—the first “basic tools of research” 
and the latter patentable inventions—no longer holds once the 
natural law is applied in a form that yields useful information 
and a specific beneficial result.405 There is no reason to suppose 
that the usual weighing of incentives against costs produces 
here a result uncharacteristically adverse to the progress of the 
useful arts. 
III.  DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE AND  
ITS ECONOMIC EFFECTS  
One thing does distinguish claim 13 from most patent 
claims: the role that knowledge plays in carrying out the 
process. Once a physician learns of the natural relationship be-
tween elevated levels of homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies, 
that physician, on reviewing a lab report, cannot help but corre-
late the result and the likely condition of the patient. In a 
process having only two steps, step one is unpatentable and 
step two would “occur automatically in the mind of any compe-
tent physician.”406 This is a serious problem, having little to do 
 
 404. Id. at 2921. 
 405. See N. Scott Pierce, A New Day Yesterday: Benefit as the Foundation 
and Limit of Exclusive Rights in Patent Law, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 373, 450−51 (2007) (arguing that a diagnosis based on elevated levels 
of homocysteine is not a natural phenomenon but a novel technique with a 
specific benefit). 
 406. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924. 
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with whether the process of diagnosis is a phenomenon of na-
ture or a basic tool of research. Usually, potential infringers, no 
matter how tempted they may be to adopt the advancements 
discovered by the patentee, can choose to avoid them. Rather 
than suffer the costs of a patent license or the risk of litigation, 
they can elect to practice techniques in the public domain—
perhaps those revealed in expired patents, or those of inventors 
who forfeited the right to obtain a patent. But physicians who 
choose to avoid claim 13 may have no such choice, beyond ab-
andoning blood tests altogether—a harsh alternative indeed. 
None of the cases on patentable subject matter, even those 
dealing with “mental steps,” pose this issue of the unwilling in-
fringer paralyzed by the burden of knowledge. But the situation 
is comparable to one that arises in trade secret law, known as 
“inevitable disclosure.”  
A. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 
Trade secret law is a branch of intellectual property go-
verned, in civil cases, by state and common law.407 It protects 
information that is valuable to a business because it is not gen-
erally known.408 One can misappropriate a trade secret by us-
ing or disclosing confidential information contrary to a legal 
duty.409 Employees generally have a duty toward their employ-
ers, even after they leave employment, to refrain from using 
trade secret information. The deliberate use of the trade secrets 
of a first employer for the benefit of a second is, therefore, a 
clear instance of misappropriation. The most difficult cases 
arise when the very nature of the employment makes avoiding 
use of the first employer’s trade secrets impossible. PepsiCo v. 
Redmond supplies the best-known example of the “inevitable 
disclosure” phenomenon.410 Redmond, a high-level executive of 
PepsiCo, resigned to take employment at Quaker Oats Co., 
which at the time was a PepsiCo rival in the markets for sports 
 
 407. Most states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005 & Supp. 
2008). 
 408. See id. § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). The subject matter of trade secret 
law overlaps with the subject matter of patent law; a product formula, for ex-
ample, might be protected as a trade secret or as a patented invention. It can-
not be both, however, because one of the obligations of a patentee is to disclose 
the invention in detail through the patent specification, after which the infor-
mation loses its status as a secret.  
 409. See id. § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 537. 
 410. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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drinks and “new age” beverages.411 While employed by PepsiCo, 
Redmond had been exposed to detailed marketing plans and 
competitive strategy.412 The court enjoined Redmond not only 
from disclosing PepsiCo’s trade secrets but also from imme-
diately assuming his new position.413 Even though Redmond 
had signed a confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo and no 
breach of that agreement had yet taken place, PepsiCo “[found] 
itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has left, 
playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big 
game.”414 Even with good intentions, it would have been im-
possible for Redmond to ignore the things he knew about Pep-
siCo’s strategy while performing similar duties for Quaker. 
PepsiCo is a controversial decision. A leading treatise on 
trade secret law denounces the “mischief”415 it is said to have 
created. Some courts have expressly rejected PepsiCo’s concept 
of inevitable disclosure.416 The source of the controversy lies in 
the conflicting interests of trade secret protection and employee 
mobility. Employers have a legitimate interest in protecting 
their trade secrets—an interest that society must recognize if 
businesses are to invest in developing proprietary informa-
tion.417 Employees, on the other hand, should not be “shackled” 
to an employer because they have been exposed to trade se-
crets, nor should they be prevented from assuming elsewhere 
the positions for which they are best suited and trained.418 In-
evitable-disclosure theories limit individual freedom, weaken 
employee bargaining power, and harm society through dimi-
nished competition.419 In some states, concerns over employee 
mobility have led to severe restrictions on contractual cove-
nants that limit postemployment opportunities.420 At least 
 
 411. Id. at 1263. 
 412. Id. at 1264. 
 413. Id. at 1272. 
 414. Id. at 1270. 
 415. 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[3][d] (2007) 
(“The mischief engendered by PepsiCo is hard to exaggerate.”). 
 416. See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
 417. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434−35 (Pa. 1960) (“Society as 
a whole greatly benefits from technological improvements. Without some 
means of post-employment protection to assure that valuable developments or 
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not afford to subsidize research or improve current methods.”). 
 418. See id. at 435. 
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 420. See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
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those covenants are the subject of bargaining at the outset; 
some regard an inevitable disclosure restraint as equivalent to 
a restrictive covenant imposed after the employment has 
ended, without consent, and without compensation to the em-
ployee.421 Accordingly, even courts that do not reject the prin-
ciple of inevitable disclosure outright may apply it “only in the 
rarest of cases.”422 
At a broad level, the concerns that animate resistance to 
inevitable disclosure in trade secret law are relevant to a pa-
tent that a knowledgeable person, carrying out otherwise legi-
timate activity, cannot help but infringe. Physicians aware of 
the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies 
would face the same difficulty as Redmond. No matter how 
they tried to compartmentalize their thoughts, inevitably they 
would remember what an elevated homocysteine level implies 
when they observe it on a lab report. In fact, their dilemma 
would be worse than Redmond’s. He could try to act as he 
would have acted without knowledge of PepsiCo’s strategic 
plans. The physicians would not have even that opportunity; 
once they had observed the correlation, the infringement would 
be complete. 
Employee mobility and bargaining power would not be 
threatened, but freedom and competition would be. The only 
choice of a physician who wished to avoid patent liability might 
be to forego the relevant blood tests. If these tests had impor-
tant uses other than diagnosing vitamin deficiencies through 
homocysteine measurements, the choice to abandon the tests 
might make the practice of medicine impossible, or at least lim-
it what the a physician could offer the public in competition 
with patent licensees. 
 
(“Once the term of an employment agreement has expired, the general public 
policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give way merely 
because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself from competition. . . . 
Important, too, are the powerful considerations of public policy which militate 
against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 421. See Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (“As a result of the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine, the employer obtains the benefit of a contractual provision it 
did not pay for, while the employee is bound by a court-imposed contract pro-
vision with no opportunity to negotiate terms or consideration.”). 
 422. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (“[T]he inevitable disclosure doctrine 
treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory. Ab-
sent evidence of actual misappropriation by an employee, the doctrine should 
be applied in only the rarest of cases.”). 
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When trade secret rights are based on duties arising in the 
course of a relationship, the parties to the relationship have an 
opportunity to negotiate an arrangement of mutual benefit. To-
day, in jurisdictions that recognize the inevitable disclosure 
principle, sophisticated employees might realize, at the outset 
of employment, that a confidentiality agreement could later re-
strict their mobility. Understanding that, they could seek to 
negotiate terms, including appropriate compensation. Patent 
rights are not based on relationships and are not the fruits of 
bargaining with potential infringers. A physician who learned 
of the homocysteine/vitamin correlation might have no prior 
opportunity to negotiate, and any negotiating that occurred af-
ter the fact might be in the form of “an offer one cannot refuse.” 
In short, the policy arguments against “inevitable infringe-
ment” seem at least as compelling as those against inevitable 
disclosure. 
B. INEVITABLE INFRINGEMENT 
The problem of the unwilling patent infringer can arise in 
other contexts. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp.,423 the patent concerned the substance paroxetine hy-
drochloride (PHC) used as an antidepressant. Originally pro-
duced in anhydrous crystals (without bound water molecules), 
the patentee discovered a hemihydrous form (with one bound 
water molecule for every two PHC molecules). In the new form 
it was more stable, making it easier to package and preserve.424 
Patent owner SmithKline argued that the defendant, even 
though still using techniques previously used to produce an-
hydrous crystals, now inevitably produced at least trace 
amounts of infringing hemihydrous PHC.425 Why? Because the 
newly introduced form of PHC “seeded” the environment, in-
troducing trace amounts of the more stable crystals into every 
production facility.426 Fabrication of pure anhydrous PHC had 
become virtually impossible, even using prior techniques, be-
cause no production facility could escape contamination.427 The 
 
 423. 403 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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 425. Id. at 1335. 
 426. Id. at 1335–36. 
 427. See id. at 1336. The district court noted that “[I]f Apotex . . . built a 
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district court ruled for the defendant, fashioning an equitable 
defense based on the role played by the patentee in causing the 
infringement.428 On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to en-
dorse the equitable defense, finding instead that the original 
production techniques, disclosed in an earlier patent, inherent-
ly produced hemihydrous PHC, thereby anticipating claims to 
the compound.429 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gajarsa focused on the di-
lemma of the unwitting infringer.430 In his view, the “unusual 
tendency [of hemihydrous PHC] to ‘appear’ even where it is 
unwanted,” contradicted the public notice function of the pa-
tent.431 A patent should clearly define the scope of the grant so 
that it can be avoided, and SmithKline’s patent failed to do 
so.432 Even with every effort to manufacture only unpatented 
anhydrous PHC, Apotex could not avoid infringing.433 Judge 
Gajarsa found the solution to the problem in § 101.434 Hemi-
hydrous PHC, as a synthetic material, was a patentable compo-
sition of matter when first created; however, it “reproduces” it-
self by natural chemical processes once released into an 
environment where production of anhydrous PHC takes 
place.435 He compared the situation to the release of a patented 
organism let loose in the wild and spreading uncontrollably.436 
Section 101, Judge Gajarsa maintained, invalidates any 
“patent claim[] drawn broadly enough to encompass products 
 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1020–21 
(N.D. Ill. 2003)). 
 428. Id. at 1342. 
 429. Id. at 1342−44. 
 430. Id. at 1358. 
 431. Id. 
 432. The meaning of the claim, however, was perfectly clear. It included 
only four words, each having a definite significance to chemists: “1. Crystalline 
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.” Id. at 1349. 
 433. Id. at 1359 (“A paroxetine anhydrate manufacturer, such as Apotex, 
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only products that scrupulously respected all patent rights, and could never-
theless infringe because a natural physical process acting upon its legitimate 
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the public.”). 
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 435. Id. at 1360. 
 436. Id. at 1361. For an extended analysis of the problem of pollen drift in 
creating unwitting infringers, see Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The 
Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87 
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that spread, appear, and ‘reproduce’ through natural 
processes.”437 Had his analysis been adopted by the majority it 
would have been interesting to consider whether it applied not 
only to spontaneously reproducing crystals or organisms but to 
ideas. 
Publishing the discovery that elevated homocysteine levels 
indicate a vitamin deficiency, even through the teachings of the 
patent itself, might be considered “seeding the environment”—
after which knowledgeable persons, even those intending to 
practice the prior art, could not help but infringe. Thomas Jef-
ferson once remarked on the tendency of ideas to spread uncon-
trollably, like a life-form released into the wild: “the moment 
[an idea] is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every 
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.”438 Cer-
tainly the negative consequences that Judge Gajarsa feared 
could occur, including “a widespread in terrorem effect crip-
pling entire industries whose artisans learn that even their 
best efforts to respect patent rights may not save them from 
liability as inadvertent, inevitable infringers.”439 The notice 
function of the patent might be, in Judge Gajarsa’s sense, 
“meaningless.”440 On the other hand, while Judge Gajarsa iden-
tified notice as the critical issue, he relied on the “natural” cha-
racter of the crystal reproduction to find the patent invalid un-
der § 101.441 Is the spread of an idea a natural process? It might 
be in the sense that it occurs spontaneously, but it is not “natu-
ral” in the sense that distinguishes non-human from human ac-
tivity. Hence, Judge Gajarsa’s conclusion that “patent law does 
not sanction the concept of inevitable infringement”442 might 
require other support in the case of the infringing physician. 
C. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THOUGHT INFRINGEMENT 
As Justice Breyer observed, patents impose costs on licen-
sees, potential infringers, and society.443 They can discourage 
technological developments, distract researchers with complex 
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legal issues, and, by offering monopolistic returns, divert re-
sources into rent seeking.444 As long as the benefits outweigh 
these costs, patents, generally speaking, fulfill the constitu-
tional mandate to promote the progress of the useful arts.445 
The benefits to be expected from patents involving thought 
processes or observations of nature are the same as for any 
other type of patent. The grant of exclusive rights encourages 
research, and the disclosures mandated by patent law contri-
bute to the art when the patent has expired. The costs, howev-
er, might be significantly greater. 
One of the perennial concerns of patent law is to confine a 
patentee’s market power within its proper limits.446 A patent 
only creates market power if products or processes covered by 
the patent have such advantages in comparison to potential 
substitutes that they can command a premium price.447 Inven-
tions that have such advantages generate a greater than com-
petitive return, which rewards the patentee for advancing the 
art. However, patentees violate the law by extending their 
market power beyond the intended scope of the patent grant.448 
One example is an unlawful tying arrangement, which condi-
tions the availability of a product where the seller has market 
power (e.g., a uniquely desirable and patented television set) on 
the additional purchase of a separate product where the seller 
has no market power (e.g., an unpatented microwave oven). 
The principle fear is that power in the market for the tying 
product, perhaps lawfully obtained, will translate into market 
power in a different market.449 Power in the market for televi-
sion sets, for example, might be used to suppress competition, 
eliminate competitors, and raise prices in the market for mi-
crowave ovens, contrary to the intentions of Congress in allow-
ing the television set to be patented.  
In some cases, a patent infringed by observing a natural 
correlation would have similar effects. Assume for the moment 
that the tests discussed in LabCorp could be used for other 
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purposes than diagnosing a vitamin deficiency. According to 
Justice Breyer, “growing recognition that elevated homocyste-
ine levels might predict risk of heart disease led to increased 
testing demand.”450 To the extent that homocysteine tests to 
predict heart disease are unrelated to the vitamin deficiency, 
they are a service that physicians should be permitted to offer 
their patients. Yet the well-informed physician could not help 
observing the vitamin deficiency “correlation” when observing 
elevated homocysteine levels on a lab report. Simply perform-
ing the tests would lead to infringement liability, without fur-
ther voluntary action. Consequently, the patentee could, at 
least theoretically, eliminate competition in the market for 
blood tests unrelated to the patented invention. 
The high costs of avoidance could be manifested in other 
ways. Physicians who did not wish to give up homocysteine 
tests altogether might investigate “clean room” techniques. 
Clean rooms have been used in other contexts where demon-
strating ignorance is advantageous.451 For example, a company 
using a computer program based on unlawfully obtained trade 
secret information might organize a clean room, staffed by pro-
grammers isolated from the misappropriated original, to create 
a functionally identical but legally blameless substitute.452 Si-
milarly, a physician who prescribed homocysteine tests for 
heart disease might turn over care of the patient to other pro-
fessionals who had never learned of the homocysteine/vitamin 
correlation. Just describing such a process, however, suggests 
its absurdity. For one thing, because the correlation is publicly 
available information, it would be difficult to find a test admin-
istrator guaranteed to possess the necessary level of ignorance. 
If such a person were found, the qualifications of that person to 
provide medical care would be in serious doubt. If the test ad-
ministrator simply returned the patient to the original physi-
cian with a recommendation to treat the patient for heart dis-
ease, the physician, inferring that the tests indicated elevated 
levels of homocysteine, could not avoid “correlating” that result 
with a possible vitamin deficiency.  
Even if it were possible to avoid the patent by cultivating 
ignorance, the result would be starkly contrary to one of the 
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overriding policy goals of patent law—to encourage the spread 
of knowledge.453 Some of the conditions attached to the is-
suance of a patent require the disclosure of information.454 The 
patentee must set forth a detailed disclosure sufficient to allow 
any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention 
without undue experimentation.455 In addition, the specifica-
tion must disclose the best mode of practicing the invention 
known to the patentee when the application was filed.456 Such 
disclosures may be described as a part of the bargain that the 
patentee makes with society—the disclosure of useful informa-
tion in exchange for a period of exclusive rights.457 It would be 
strange indeed if patent law encouraged ignorance of the very 
disclosures that patent law demands. 
Importantly, these problems would occur only if homo-
cysteine tests had substantial noninfringing uses. If checking 
for a vitamin deficiency were the only purpose for conducting 
the test, infringement would no longer be involuntary and no 
independent market would be threatened. It might still seem 
odd that physicians could be barred from conducting an unpa-
tented test, but this is not a phenomenon unknown in patent 
law. Through the principle of contributory infringement, a pa-
tent owner can prohibit others from selling an unpatented 
component of a claimed combination, if the component has no 
substantial noninfringing uses.458 Even something previously 
known can come under the control of a patentee—for example, 
a known substance having no use except in connection with the 
patentee’s discovery. 
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The latter occurred in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co.459 The patentee discovered that the unpatented com-
pound propanil could be used as a selective herbicide in rice 
paddies.460 Propanil had no other known use.461 Farmers who 
purchased propanil from the patentee received an implied li-
cense to use it on their crops.462 Because rice farmers who pur-
chased propanil elsewhere had no such license, other sellers of 
propanil became contributory infringers.463 Even though enforc-
ing the patent meant barring sales of unpatented propanil, the 
Supreme Court held that the patentee’s refusal to license was 
not an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly.464 The Pa-
tent Act, wrote the court, 
[E]ffectively confer[s] upon the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his pa-
tent rights, a limited power to exclude others from competition in 
nonstaple goods. A patentee may sell a nonstaple article himself while 
enjoining others from marketing that same good without his authori-
zation. By doing so, he is able to eliminate competitors and thereby to 
control the market for that product.465 
That control was no more than the patentee’s due because 
the market was entirely dependent on the patentee’s discovery. 
Without it, no one would buy propanil at all. Whether the pa-
tentee chose to license farmers who used propanil or set itself 
up as the only seller of propanil was a matter of indifference. 
Similarly, no meaningful extension of the patent grant would 
occur if the LabCorp patentee controlled homocysteine tests 
having no use other than to detect a vitamin deficiency. 
D. SETTING LIMITS 
The dangerous patents based on natural relationships or 
“correlations” are those one can only avoid (1) by ignorance, or 
(2) by foregoing activity that should not be controlled by the pa-
tentee. The challenges lie in identifying those patents and in 
finding legal tools to deal with them. 
The obvious place to begin is with patentable subject mat-
ter under § 101, but methods of observing and correlating are 
always “processes,” in a literal sense. They are not principles of 
nature in the abstract; they are, potentially, ways to apply na-
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ture for specific, useful purposes. And they are not, necessarily, 
“basic tools of research” in a way that distinguishes them from 
other patentable inventions. One could require that a statutory 
process transform a physical substance, but this would be un-
desirable as a matter of policy if it prevented, for example, pa-
tents on useful (and technological) software inventions. A more 
limited solution may lie in the revival of the until-recently mo-
ribund “mental steps doctrine.”466 The weakness with that solu-
tion, as with a more physical concept of “process,” is that one 
might avoid the issue by adding physical steps. 
Observing nature often requires physical process steps, 
like “assaying” the blood of a patient to measure homocysteine. 
Once such steps are added to the claim, the process as a whole 
becomes a physical process. One cannot ignore the physical 
steps because they are not new; to do so would be to confuse 
novelty with patentable subject matter.467 But adding these 
steps does not cure the basic problem. A potential infringer 
might avoid liability by foregoing tests or assays, but possibly 
at the cost of using the results of such tests for legitimate pur-
poses—an overextension of the patentee’s monopoly. Courts 
might ignore “data gathering steps,” as they have sometimes 
done when judging the subject matter status of mathematical 
algorithms.468 However, even if this were consistent with the 
holistic approach adopted after Diehr,469 it would affect all cor-
relation patents, including those that do not threaten undesir-
able spill-over effects. What distinguishes a “good” patent from 
a “bad” patent is not whether the physical process steps are 
merely data gathering, but whether the data gathering has any 
purpose other than the one discovered by the patentee. 
One also has to consider the effect of physical process steps 
subsequent to the correlation—like administering vitamin sup-
plements to a patient. Diehr dismissed “token post solution ac-
tivity” in the context of mathematical calculations.470 Treating 
a patient hardly seems a “token” activity, particularly if im-
proved by observation and correlation. Indeed, one could speak 
in a general sense of an improved process of treating a patient, 
just as Diehr spoke of an improved process of curing rubber. If 
the physical process steps occurred after the mental steps, one 
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could avoid infringement by ignoring what one had learned—by 
taking no action to correct the vitamin deficiency. Aside from 
the ethical problem of deliberately withholding medical care, 
attempts to ignore what one knows may prove futile. A doctor 
might, like Redmond, find it impossible to continue at all. Nei-
ther § 101 nor the complex heritage of the mental steps doc-
trine provide tools to address this distinction. 
Creative minds might look beyond § 101 for solutions. One 
could argue that infringement cannot occur without volition.471 
It can occur without intent,472 including infringement by per-
sons who are unaware of the patent, but even the unintentional 
infringer generally undertakes some action voluntarily—such 
as choosing to make and sell an apparatus that might prove, 
however unexpectedly, to infringe the rights of a patentee. A 
patent that could be infringed simply by thinking permits not 
even that degree of volition. On the other hand, choosing to 
conduct homocysteine tests having both infringing and nonin-
fringing uses would be a deliberate act. The physician conduct-
ing the test and aware of the patent would know that, inevita-
bly, observing an elevated level of homocysteine would lead to 
the infringing correlation. The infringement would not be free 
of all volition, but the physician should nevertheless be pro-
tected for the sake of preserving the alternative use of the test. 
Another possibility is an equitable defense based on the pa-
tentee’s role in causing the infringement. The district court in 
SmithKline crafted such a defense based on the patentee’s re-
sponsibility for “seeding the environment,” causing unavoidable 
infringement by those seeking only to practice the prior art.473 
Similarly, a patentee who “seeded the environment” with know-
ledge might be denied an opportunity to enforce the patent.474 
The difficulty with equitable defenses is that they are usually, 
by nature, flexible remedies dependent on the circumstances of 
each case. An equitable defense could not be used, like an inva-
lidity defense, to strike down patents that should not be en-
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forced against anyone. Also, an equitable defense would provide 
uncertain protection to potential infringers unless the circums-
tances for invoking the defense could be clearly defined. If they 
could be so defined, and if they related to the nature of the pa-
tent rather than the circumstances of each infringement, then 
an invalidity defense is a more attractive solution. Unfortu-
nately, no existing invalidity defense exactly fits the bill. 
The best answer may lie in the adoption of the following 
principle: no patent claim may be enforced if infringement can 
be avoided only by foregoing or modifying activity not reserved 
exclusively to the patent owner. Activity reserved exclusively to 
the patent owner includes both that which is claimed, and that 
which has no substantial noninfringing use. This principle 
might apply in some situations having nothing to do with men-
tal processes—as in the case of genetically modified corn invad-
ing other cornfields.475 If the patented strain intruded on the 
land of an innocent farmer left with no option but to abandon 
the field, the patent could not be enforced. In the context of a 
method claim applying observations of nature to modify a phys-
ical process (e.g., applying test results to modify a course of 
treatment), the territory reserved to the patent owner would 
include the process in its entirety and portions of the process 
having no substantial noninfringing use. If tests had no object 
except to perform the patented process, such tests would be 
forbidden, just as the sale of a part useful only in a patented 
combination is forbidden. But if the tests had other uses, they 
could not be enjoined, even if the person who performed them 
would inevitably apply the results in the manner claimed—not 
by choice, but by force of logic. 
Although this proposition does not fit neatly into any exist-
ing category of patent invalidity, it is consistent with the policy 
of confining a patentee’s market power to the intended chan-
nels.476 The discoverers of important technological advance-
ments would be suitably rewarded, ensuring that such discove-
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ries continue. At the same time, patentees would not have pow-
er over activities unrelated to their advancements. Of course 
controversy might arise over the existence of a noninfringing 
use for any process of analysis. Scientific inquiry alone might 
be offered as a substantial use, or one might worry that limit-
ing tests in the absence of a noninfringing use would forestall 
the discovery of such uses. These are legitimate concerns, but 
the same concerns do not prevent patentees from controlling 
unpatented physical substances, such as propanil, that have no 
known noninfringing uses. 
Another issue would be whether a potential infringer can 
avoid completing the patented method. If the method includes 
not just the step of drawing a conclusion, but physical process 
steps governed by observation, avoiding those physical steps 
will often be possible, even if one is reluctant to do one thing 
when one knows there is a superior alternative. Patents often, 
however, present potential infringers with this very dilemma. 
An engineer who has read a new patent disclosing a superior 
apparatus may be sorely tempted to build one, but knows that 
the only choice is to adopt an unpatented alternative or secure 
a license. What sets apart processes with a mental component 
is the problem of compartmentalization, familiar from the trade 
secret cases. If one is already treating a patient, and has ob-
tained test results for legitimate reasons, how can one avoid 
the influence of a patented insight? With the proper context 
provided through expert testimony, courts should have little 
difficulty in identifying the hopeless case and striking down the 
patent that creates it. 
Some predicted that Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion he-
ralded a dramatic reassessment of the bounds of patentable 
subject matter.477 Comiskey has vindicated such predictions al-
ready. If continued reassessment comes from the courts, or 
from a Congress now deeply engaged in the possibility of patent 
reform, recognition of the principle set forth above could estab-
lish, more effectively than vague prohibitions against patenting 
“tools of research” or “principles of nature,” a system that re-
wards discovery, encourages the spread of knowledge, and con-
fines the market power of patents within appropriate limits.  
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 CONCLUSION  
Although the language of § 101 suggests a simple inquiry, 
the analytical complexity of patentable subject matter seems 
inexhaustible. For more than a century, courts have struggled 
to distinguish between patentable inventions and unpatentable 
principles, producing an intricate and perplexing set of rules, 
some still embraced and others apparently abandoned. Yet 
even today fundamental questions cannot be answered with 
certainty. The LabCorp opinion poses one such question—
whether one can patent a useful method that consists in ob-
serving and drawing conclusions, based on a newly discovered 
natural relationship. Justice Breyer addressed the question 
principally through the principle/application dichotomy, which 
has long stood as a bastion against denying others the “basic 
tools of research.” In fact, the danger of the LabCorp patent has 
little to do with research, and the principle/application distinc-
tion suggests that the invention should be patentable. The 
greater threat posed by the LabCorp patent and others of its 
kind hinges on the role that knowledge plays in infringement. 
Even well-intentioned competitors of the patent owner may 
find infringement unavoidable, except by cultivating ignorance 
or abandoning legitimate activity. This could supply the patent 
owner with unintended and undesirable market power. Unfor-
tunately there are no simple tools at hand to deal with this is-
sue, demonstrating that even after many decades of wrestling 
with patentable subject matter there is still urgent work to be 
done. 
